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I. Introduction
A recent case from the Washington Supreme Court may mark a change
in the attitude that the state has historically held toward Native Americans
and their treaty rights. In State v. Jim, 1 the Washington Supreme Court, in a
6-3 decision, denied the assertion of the state’s criminal jurisdiction in a
congressionally designated treaty fishing site. Acting in the absence of clear
congressional intent, the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the tribes,
ruling that tribal reservations extend to certain exclusively reserved fishing
* J.D., 2013, Lewis & Clark Law School; B.A., 2008, University of Washington.
1. 273 P.3d 434, 441 (Wash. 2012).
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sites. 2 This conclusion, far from unavoidable, could signal a much welcome
change in the relationship between the state of Washington and the
Northwest tribes.
Prior to the arrival of European settlers, Native Americans in the Pacific
Northwest enjoyed an abundance of natural resources, most notably
anadromous fish. 3 Many of these tribes made a “seasonal round”
throughout the year, moving from one harvest to the next. 4 For the
Columbia River Treaty tribes, fish were, and arguably still are, the most
important natural resource.5 The fish are a cornerstone of their culture and
identity. 6
During the years “1854 and 1855, the United States executed nine
treaties with twenty-three tribes” 7 in the Pacific Northwest to foster rapid
non-Native development. In exchange for ceding vast areas of land, these
treaties reserved the right of treaty tribes to harvest fish “at all usual and
accustomed stations.” 8 Due to the incredible importance of fish to the
Native American lifestyle, they would not have signed the treaties without
this promise. 9 But the implications of such a promise by the United States
federal government are still not fully understood. 10

2. Id. at 437-38.
3. 1 COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N (CRITFC), WY-KAN-USH-MI WAKISH-WIT, SPIRIT OF THE SALMON: THE COLUMBIA RIVER ANADROMOUS FISH RESTORATION
PLAN OF THE NEZ PERCE, UMATILLA, WARM SPRINGS, AND YAKAMA TRIBES 3-1 (1995),
available at http://docs.stream netlibrary.org/CRITFC/trpv1_full.pdf.
4. Id. at 2-7.
5. William Fisher, Note, The Culverts Opinion and the Need for a Broader PropertyBased Construct, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 491, 510 (2008).
6. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2-4.
7. Vincent Mulier, Recognizing the Full Scope of the Right to Take Salmon Under the
Stevens Treaties: The History of Fishing Rights Litigation in the Pacific Northwest, 31 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 41, 41 (2006-2007).
8. Id. at 42 (citing Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of
Indians, arts. I-III, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951).
9. CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON,
TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 12 (2000).
10. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 494; see also Michael C. Blumm & Jane G. Steadman,
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and Habitat Protection: The Martinez Decision Supplies a
Resounding Judicial Reaffirmation, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653, 704-05 (2009); Ruth
Langridge, The Right to Habitat Protection, 29 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 41, 41
(2008); O. Yale Lewis III, Comment, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right as Part of the
Trinity of Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 281, 281 (2002-2003).
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Native American tribes have generally faced an uphill battle in enforcing
these treaty fishing rights, and throughout history the states have been the
tribes’ worst enemies. The state of Washington and the Washington
Supreme Court have been no exception.11 When it comes to honoring tribal
rights to salmon, Washington has been reluctant to say the least. 12 The
state’s treatment of the tribes has necessitated strong federal rulings
vindicating tribal rights, and even federal “fishmasters” to intervene in state
fishing activities on behalf of the tribes.13
Though the exact contours of the fishing rights guaranteed in the Stevens
treaties are still unclear, the most fundamental right involved is a right of
access to traditional fishing spots. 14
Still, Washington State has been slow even to recognize this right.15
More significantly, even where access to these sites was recognized and not
inhibited, it has rarely been thought that the State lacked criminal
jurisdiction in these areas. These sites were considered to lie outside of the
established Indian reservations and therefore within state jurisdiction.
Through Public Law 280, Congress gave several states the ability to
assume jurisdiction over Indian Country, which was later amended to
require Indian consent. 16 Before the amendment, Washington lawfully
asserted criminal jurisdiction over Indian land, with the exception of
Indians on tribal lands or allotted lands within an established reservation,
and held in trust by the United States government. 17
On June 25, 2008, Lester Ray Jim was cited by the State of Washington
for unlawful use of a net and unlawfully retaining undersized sturgeon,
which he caught incidentally with a gill net while commercial fishing. 18
Jim, a citizen of the Yakama Nation, was fishing at the Maryhill Treaty
Fishing Access Site, which Congress set aside exclusively for use by the
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. Blumm & Steadman, supra note 10, at 669-70.
14. Brian E. Schartz, Student Article, Fishing for a Rule in a Sea of Standards: A
Theoretical Justification for the Boldt Decision, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 314, 316 (2007).
15. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 9.
16. State Jurisdiction Over Offenses Committed by or Against Indians in the Indian
Country, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2012); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)).
17. Indians--Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction of State, 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 941; see
also Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 499,
502 (1979) (holding that WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 complies with Public Law 280 and
is constitutional).
18. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 435 (Wash. 2012).
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Columbia River Treaty tribes in 1988, as an exercise of the tribe’s treaty
fishing rights. 19 Though his act violated state law, it was not a violation of
Yakama Nation tribal law. 20 Jim claims that he was in Indian Country and
on an established reservation, and therefore tribal fishing law should
apply. 21 The State claimed criminal jurisdiction over the fishing site under
Public Law 280 and section 37.12.010 of the Revised Code of Washington,
but the Washington Supreme Court, perhaps departing from its traditional
stance on tribal rights, ruled that the State lacked criminal jurisdiction.22
In light of the State’s history, this liberal interpretation of tribal power-limiting the State’s criminal jurisdiction in Treaty Fishing Access Sites
(TFASes)--may be significant. In fact, it marks a departure from the court’s
historical treatment of Native American rights, one that simultaneously
extends tribal jurisdictional authority.
Northwest tribes have been dealt a harsh hand by state governments
since the arrival of white settlers. Of particular interest is the difficulty
tribes have had in securing their most important natural resources--fish. The
road toward fully recognized fishing treaty rights has been a slow and
painful one, and the charge has almost always been led by Federal courts.23
The State’s regulation of fishing activities has often clashed with tribal
treaty rights, and the state (with the help of its courts) has often succeeded
in making life difficult for Indian fisherman. 24 In the midst of this clash, the
State’s criminal jurisdiction has always been thought to cover traditional
fishing spots. Usual and accustomed fishing sites were not thought of as
being part of any Indian reservation. 25
In the middle of a long struggle to have their fishing rights fully
recognized and their tribal sovereignty honored, the tribes have received a
much welcomed, and perhaps unexpected, helping hand from the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 676 (“While both state and tribal law restrict the retention of undersized
sturgeon, only state statute makes it unlawful to ‘[f]ail[] to return unauthorized fish to the
water immediately.’ Tribal law allows ‘[a]ll Yakama members . . . a reasonable opportunity
to release alive any sturgeon of prohibited length incidentally caught in authorized
fisheries.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
21. Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 7-8, Jim, 273 P.3d 434 (No. 84716-9).
22. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437.
23. Schartz, supra note 14, at 316 (“The Boldt decision's 50% rule was the culmination
of almost seventy years of federal case law that slowly expanded the scope of Indian fishing
rights.”).
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (allowing access over
private property in order to gain access to fish).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/3

No. 1]

STATE V. JIM: A NEW ERA?

105

Washington State Supreme Court. Simply put, the Washington Supreme
Court would not have produced a ruling like this one thirty years ago, and it
may mark a welcome change in the strained relationship between
Washington State and the Northwest tribes.
Part II explains the history leading up to the treaty between the United
States government and the Yakama Nation, and how the treaty has been
interpreted. Part III outlines the historic relationship between Washington
and the Yakama nation as it relates to fishing rights, and introduces State v.
Jim. Part IV traces the criminal jurisdiction on Indian lands, and how the
court applied relevant statutes to the Maryhill site at issue in Jim. Part V
explains possible future implications of the State v. Jim decision, and in
conclusion the author states that this ruling has major positive implications
for the future of tribal governments in the State of Washington.
II. Background
It is difficult to summarize or even describe the effect that European
arrival has had on Native Americans. Indians have “long suffered under the
cultural oppression of European and American societies.”26 Among the
greatest cultural differences were the differing ways of viewing land and
natural resources. 27
Native Americans were largely hunter-gatherer societies with some
cultivation activities. 28 The world-view of many tribes, prior to white
contact, was premised on an usufructuary view of the universe.29 Indian
villages often moved from place to place “to find maximum abundance
through minimal work” and “reduc[ing] their impact on the land”; the
English “required permanent settlements” and had a different perspective
on how to relate to their environment. 30 These clashing views were still
prevalent in the 1800s when white settlement began to accelerate in the
Northwest. 31
26. Robert J. Miller, Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe
Goes Whaling, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 165, 166 (2000-2001).
27. WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY
OF NEW ENGLAND 167 (1983).
28. See Dean R. Snow, The First Americans and the Differentiation of Hunter-Gatherer
Cultures, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS 125
(Bruce G. Trigger & Wilcomb E. Washburn eds., 1996).
29. JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 2008).
30. CRONON, supra note 27, at 53.
31. Id. at 168.
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The Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804 to 1805 sparked the Great
Migration along the Oregon Trail, which began in 1843. 32 In the Pacific
Northwest, white settlers encountered an Indian culture that was highly
dependent on the abundance of salmon and steelhead trout.33 “The regular
salmon runs provided eighty to ninety percent of the diet of many of the
tribes[,]” and “[a]nadromous fish have [always] been an integral part of
Northwest Indian life . . . .” 34
In the nineteenth century, the United States federal government offered
non-Native settlers free land, abundant resources, and safety in exchange
for inhabiting the West, while simultaneously “assur[ing] Indians that they
would be able to live on their lands in peace.”35 The population of white
settlers in the Northwest grew rapidly in the 1800s. For example, the nonNative population of Oregon grew from 50,000 in 1860, to 400,000 by
1900. 36 “By the turn of the century 1.1 million people lived in the
[Northwest] states of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho.” 37 In stark contrast,
only 20,000 Natives lived in this same area, as their populations had
experienced a 95 percent decline.38
The “invasion of [white] settle[ment]” often divested Indian people of all
their “means of subsistence.” 39 White settlers appeared unsympathetic to
the Native inhabitants, who some assumed “must soon be swept from the
face of the earth.” 40 And the government did not keep its promises that
Indians would be allowed to live peacefully on their lands. 41

32. ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 29, at 495.
33. Joe Robinson, Catching Salmon by Court Order: Treaty Fishing Rights in Puget
Sound, ENVIRONS, Aug. 1986, at 1, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/10/1/environs.pdf;
see also Mulier, supra note 7, at 43 (discussing “the abundance of salmon, sturgeon, and
lamprey that migrated annually through the region’s rivers and streams”).
34. Robert J. Miller, Comment, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties,
Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543, 551-52 (1991) (saying that
“From the earliest known times, these migrating fish figured prominently in Indian religious
life, trade, and culture . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
35. In re Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d
68, 75 (Ariz. 2001) [hereinafter Adjudication].
36. MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF
THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 65-67 (2002).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. S. REP. NO. 102–133, at 2 (1991).
40. Id.
41. In re Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d
68, 75 (Ariz. 2001).
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Facing growing pressure from incoming settlers, the Northwest Indians
entered into a series of treaties with the United States. “In the early 1850s,
[(after Washington was organized as a territory)], an increasing flow of
American settlers poured into the lowlands of Puget Sound and the river
valleys north of the Columbia.” 42 Isaac Stevens, the superintendent of
Indian affairs and the first man to serve as governor of Washington, 43 was
commissioned to negotiate with the Natives.44 In 1854, Stevens began to
hold treaty councils with tribes across the state, eventually meeting eight
different times with tribes from the Puget Sound to Great Falls, Montana. 45
Steven’s goal was to “smooth the way for settlement by inducing the
Indians of the area to move voluntarily onto reservations.” 46
A. The Treaty
To achieve westward expansion, "Congress chose treaties rather than
conquest as the means to acquire vast Indian lands.” 47 In fact, in just two
years alone (1854 and 1855), “the United States executed nine treaties with
twenty-three tribes and confederations of tribes and bands indigenous to the
Columbia Basin and northwestern Washington.” 48 The United States’s
strategy “in negotiating treaties with American Indian tribes was to gain
land cessions and guarantees of peace so that American ‘manifest destiny’
and settlement of the American continent could proceed as peaceably as
possible.” 49 One of the tribes’ purposes in negotiating the treaties was to
reserve access to fisheries, which their lifestyle depended upon.
Treaties with tribes are “essentially . . . contract[s] between two
sovereigns[,]” 50 and “[l]ike any treaty between the United States and
42. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 1975).
43. BLUMM, supra note 36, at 57. Stevens was not only the government's treaty
negotiator, but also “a surveyor of a potential transcontinental railroad.” Id. He was “a young
and ambitious politician . . . determined to facilitate rapid white settlement.” Id. at 59.
44. Washington, 520 F.2d at 682.
45. Kent Richards, The Stevens Treaties of 1854-1855: An Introduction, 106 OR. HIST.
Q. 342 (2005).
46. Washington, 520 F.2d at 682.
47. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 330 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. Mulier, supra note 7, at 41.
49. Miller, supra note 26, at 189. The United States operated under the doctrine of
discovery when exercising manifest destiny. Id. at 189 n.122.
50. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979); State v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1077 (Wash. 1999); see also Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the "Deadliest Enemies" Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA
L. REV. 73, 86 (2007) (“The powers vested in Indian tribes are inherent powers of a limited
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another sovereign nation, [they are] the supreme law of the land and
binding on the State until Congress limits or abrogates the treaty.”51
Under the treaties, the tribal groups ceded approximately sixty-four
million acres of land to the United States, achieving “one of the largest
peaceful real estate transfers in the history of the world . . . .” 52 The treaties
all had the same “essential elements,” and reserved for the tribes small
reservations as homelands. 53 Despite ceding “their nomadic lifestyle and
most of their territory[,] [the tribes] were unwilling to give up the right to
fish,” 54 reserving for themselves “the exclusive right of taking fish in the
streams and rivers flowing through or bordering these reservations, and the
right of taking fish ‘in common with’ non-Indians at off-reservation ‘usual
and accustomed’ fishing sites.” 55 Many of the Stevens treaties had
provisions similar to that found in the Yakama Nation treaty, 56 which
reserved a number of rights for the tribes, including:
The exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams, where
running through or bordering said reservation, is further secured
to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary
buildings for curing them; together with the privilege of hunting,
gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle
upon open and unclaimed land. 57

sovereignty that has never been extinguished.”).
51. Buchanan, 978 P.2d at 1077; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (mandating that “all
Treaties made, . . . under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
740 (1986) (requiring “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between
its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve
that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-03
(1975) (holding that Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express
its intent to do so).
52. Blumm & Steadman, supra note 10, at 655.
53. Mulier, supra note 7, at 41.
54. Miller, supra note 34, at 552.
55. Mulier, supra note 7, at 41. Some tribes also exchanged land in treaties for “free
medical care, schools, occupational training, and annuity payments.” United States v.
Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 1998).
56. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1975).
57. Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, supra note 8,
at art. III.
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Appearing “substantially the same in all of the Stevens Treaties, [the
language of this paragraph] has been the subject of extensive litigation in
both state and federal court during much of the last century.” 58 Exactly
what these treaties establish is still open to debate.59
These treaties were written in English and read aloud in English for the
tribal members’ commentary and endorsement, despite the fact that few
Indians understood the language. 60 Negotiators attempted to translate the
treaties into trade jargon common to the Northwest tribes,61 at times
translating it a second time into the specific language of the tribe
involved. 62 Multiple translations only made the treaties’ meaning more
obscure. 63 Although Governor “Stevens had on his staff people who could
interpret the Indians’ native tongue . . . instead he chose to use Chinook.” 64
The resulting translation could only convey “the basic nature of the treaty
promises.” 65
Despite the treaties’ ambiguity, “Indian tribes were mostly aware of what
business was being conducted in treaty negotiations and generally they
insisted on retaining in the treaties various rights that were crucial to their
cultures and religions.” 66 Before the treaties were signed, Columbia Basin
Natives moved unrestrained throughout the basin, following the seasonal
abundance. 67 The promise of permanent fishing rights was absolutely
58. State v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1076-77 (Wash. 1999) (footnote omitted).
59. See generally Lewis, supra note 10, at 281 (suggesting that although many courts
have tried to examine the elements of the fishing right, its meaning is still open to
interpretation).
60. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 330-31 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. Miller, supra note 34, at 553 (stating that the treaties were translated using Chinook
jargon, which contained only 300 words and failed to convey complex concepts, causing
dissension among legal scholars’ interpretations).
62. Miller, supra note 26, at 191.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 553 n.70 (quoting Dumawish v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530, 536-37 (1934));
see also WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 11.
65. Fisher, supra note 5, at 498 (citing United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 683
(9th Cir. 1975)). One interpreter, when asked by Stevens “whether he could get the Indians
to sign” the treaties, went so far as to say, "I can get these Indians to sign their death
warrant," leaving little doubt that much of the true meaning of the treaties was lost in
translation. Alex Tizon, 25 Years After the Boldt Decision: The Fish Tale That Changed
History, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7, 1999, 8:24 PM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.
com/archive/?date=19990207&slug=2943039.
66. Miller, supra note 26, at 189.
67. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2-7.
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essential to entering into a treaty with the United States,68 and
“[n]egotiators for the United States found they could not get the Indian
tribes to cede their land without allowing the Indians to retain the right to
fish.” 69
To the tribes, the right of taking fish was the most important clause in the
treaty 70 because access to traditional fishing spots was “not much less
necessary to the existence of Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.” 71
The clause retained tribal freedom to leave the reservations and gain access
to this vital resource at their accustomed locations.72 Without the “promise
of perpetual access to this . . . resource,” it is doubtful that the Indians
would have signed over such vast tracks of land. 73
The sincerity with which Stevens and the United States government
regarded their obligations in the midst of these negotiations remains
questionable. In its somber history of negotiating with Native Americans,
the United States government has subsequently broken treaty promises. 74
As for Native fishing rights, it is unclear whether Washington State’s
government officials ever really recognized this treaty right. 75 This attitude
likely finds its roots in anti-Native sentiment that has been present from the
United States’s impetus.
From the birth of the nation, “[m]ost Americans believed that Indian
tribes would just slowly disappear and die off as the American pioneers and
settlers expanded the frontier and built new farms and cities . . . .”76 The
founding fathers assumed that Indians would not be on the continent for
long. 77 In fact, the disappearance of Indian people was “both hoped for and
68. United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1437 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev’d in
part on other grounds, United States v. Washington, 135 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1998).
69. Miller, supra note 34, at 543.
70. United States v. Washington (Phase II Trial), 506 F. Supp. 187, 190 (W.D. Wash.
1980), rev’d in part on other grounds, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
71. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
72. Fisher, supra note 5, at 498.
73. Id. at 510.
74. See generally RUPERT COSTO & JEANNETTE HENRY, INDIAN TREATIES: TWO
CENTURIES OF DISHONOR (1977); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN
TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1974).
75. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 52-54.
76. Inst. for Tribal Gov’t, Government-to-Government Desk Guide for Native American
& Alaska Native Tribal Governments and the U.S. Department of Defense 47 (2007), available
at http://www.denix.osd.mil/cr/upload/05-254_Desk-Guide_final_DENIX.pdf. This attitude
was exemplified in George Washington’s infamous “savage as wolf” letter in 1783. Id.
77. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 509,
559 (2007); Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the
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legislated for by the United States Congress for over 150 years.” 78 State and
local governments often made every effort to force Native Americans to
leave. 79 At the time the treaties were signed, salmon were thought to be
inexhaustible, and Stevens likely believed that Native American peoples
would disappear before the salmon did. 80
However, more than 150 years after the Stevens treaties, the populations
of most Indian tribes have experienced a period of growth,81 and the
Columbia River Treaty tribes are returning to pre-1855 population levels. 82
While much of the traditional culture of Indian life has disappeared, the role
of salmon in modern Indian life has assumed an even greater significance, 83
placing continued importance on treaty fishing rights. Even today, fishing
provides a vital part of the subsistence, livelihood, and remaining culture
for many Indians in the Northwest.84 “Without salmon returning to [their]
rivers and streams,” some believe that they would “cease to be Indian
people.” 85
The Stevens Treaties’ fishing rights were essential to the Native way of
life, and were the central consideration for treaties that allowed non-Indian
settlement. 86 “What Isaac Stevens could never have foreseen is that, more
than a century later, courts would be confronted with vibrant Indian
societies and his opaque phraseology about Indian fishing rights.” 87 The
process of interpreting these rights continues today.

21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 280 (1993).
78. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 79. See generally CHRISTINE BOLT, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY AND REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE AMERICAN
INDIANS (1st ed. 1987); see also Arthur S. Miller, Myth and Reality in American
Constitutionalism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 181, 201 (1984) (book review) ("The founders wrote that
'all men are created equal,' but they did not believe their own rhetoric; they were the same
men who began the systematic genocide of [N]ative Americans . . . .").
79. See generally STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND
POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005).
80. Tizon, supra note 65.
81. American Indians by the Numbers, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/
aihmcensus1.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2014).
82. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2-4.
83. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE
MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 71 (1970).
84. Id.
85. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2-4.
86. See generally ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 29.
87. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 12, 14.
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B. Treaty Interpretation
Aside from being the most important clauses in the treaty, the reserved
fishing right clauses are “also the most heavily litigated treaty clauses in the
entire record of treaties between the United States and indigenous peoples .
. . .” 88 Reserved fishing rights have been litigated seven times before the
United States Supreme Court 89 and countless times before lower courts.
There were many troubling aspects of the treaties negotiated with the
Northwest tribes. While the United States had legal representation, the
tribes had none. 90 The government often used “sharp tactics, threats,
fraudulent practices, and gifts and alcohol as coercion in the
negotiations.” 91 Also when two non-warring nations sign a treaty it is
usually assumed that they bargained “at arm’s length” 92; realistically,
however, rather than arms-length transactions, many treaties were
essentially imposed on tribes with no choice but to consent. 93 There is
evidence that some Stevens Treaty tribes had “complete understanding of
the situation” and that “tribal negotiators were sophisticated and . . . made
their arguments precisely and ably.” 94 The general understanding, however,
is that Stevens viewed the treaty negotiation as a “command-and-obey

88. Mulier, supra note 7, at 42; see also Blumm & Steadman, supra note 10, at 673-74
(“[T]he primary purpose of the treaties was to reserve fish in order to preserve an economic
and cultural way of life.”).
89. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash. (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977);
Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe
v. Dep’t of Game of Wash. (Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
90. Miller, supra note 26, at 191.
91. Id.
92. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979).
93. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970) ("The Indian Nations
did not seek out the United States and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length
transaction. Rather, treaties were imposed upon them and they had no choice but to
consent.").
94. Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and the National Forests: The Case of
the Aboriginal Lands of the Nez Perce Tribe, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 435, 438 (1998) (“[T]he
stereotype of Indian leaders at treaty talks as being passive and overmatched intellectually is
wrong.”).
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process, not a negotiation.” 95 He “had his script” and stuck to it, often
dictating terms. 96
Federal courts have recognized these issues and, consequently, have
interpreted Indian treaties in a manner favorable to tribes.97 Because of the
troubling aspects of the treaties between the United States and tribes and
also the fiduciary relationship between the two,98 “[c]ourts have uniformly
held that treaties . . . must be liberally construed in favor of establishing
Indian rights.” 99 Courts have developed "canons of construction,"
interpreting the treaties favorably to the tribes when encountering “coercive
conduct and unfair treaty making by the United States.” 100 These canons
dictate that treaties must “be construed, not according to the technical
meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they
would naturally be understood by the Indians,” 101 and that any ambiguities
in treaty language or the surrounding negotiations must be resolved in
favor of the tribe. 102
Another key principle of treaty interpretation is known as the
“reservation of rights doctrine.” First described in United States v.
Winans, 103 a case involving interpretation of a Stevens Treaty made with
Yakama Nation, the “reservation of rights doctrine” stands for the
proposition that a treaty between the federal government and a tribal
government is not a grant of rights to the Indians, but rather a grant from
them such that any right not specifically given away in a treaty is assumed
to remain with the tribe. 104 The reservation of rights doctrine has
consistently been applied to the fishing and hunting provisions of the
Stevens Treaties 105--rights, which the Indians are said to have enjoyed from
time immemorial.
95. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 11.
96. Id. at 11-12. These abrasive tactics resulted in several violent post-treaty rebellions.
Id. at 11.
97. Miller, supra note 26, at 192.
98. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992).
99. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Indian Reservation v. Washington, 96 F.3d 334,
340 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. Miller, supra note 26, at 192.
101. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
102. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 n.17 (1978);
Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
103. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
104. Id. at 381.
105. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
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C. Fishing Sites and the Right of Access
At the time the treaty was made the fishing places were part of
Indian country, subject to the occupancy of the Indians, with all
the rights such occupancy gave. The object of the treaty was to
limit the occupancy to certain lands and to define rights outside
of them. 106
For the tribes negotiating treaties with Stevens, the right to access fishing
sites outside of the reservation was considered the most important treaty
right; because “[t]he salmon fed them physically and spiritually” and
economically, “[a]ccess to the rivers meant everything.” 107
Today, this right of Native Americans to access their traditional fishing
spots is the foundation of an important and evolving right for the treaty
tribes. 108 The full scope of this right and the government’s duties under it
have not been fully recognized or delineated yet. 109 A primary concern of
the Native Americans “was that they have freedom to move about to gather
food, particularly salmon.” 110 Consequently, “[t]he earliest right recognized
by the courts was a ‘right of access’ that permitted Indians to continue their
fishing activities . . . in traditional locations.” 111 The Yakama Nation
successfully fought for this right in United States v. Taylor, 112 before
Washington had even become a state. Courts, in the face of intense
controversy, have affirmed the tribes’ right to take fish at customary fishing
sites, recognizing that this requires access to those sites. 113 Though the
fishing clause was meant to protect much more than simply a right of
access to customary fishing sites, even this was met with opposition. 114
443 U.S. 658, 679-81 (1979); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 196 (1918).
106. Winans, 198 U.S. at 379.
107. Tizon, supra note 65; see also COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra
note 3, at 4-2; Lewis, supra note 10, at 289.
108. Fisher, supra note 5, at 494; see also Schartz, supra note 14, at 316 (“The Boldt
decision's 50% rule was the culmination of almost seventy years of federal case law that
slowly expanded the scope of Indian fishing rights.”).
109. Fisher, supra note 5, at 494.
110. Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D.
Wash. 1974).
111. Schartz, supra note 14, at 316; see also Blumm & Steadman, supra note 10, at 653
(“[T]racing the evolution of the treaty fishing right in federal courts--from a right of access,
to a right to a fair share of the salmon harvest, to a right of habitat protection.”).
112. 13 P. 333 (Wash. Terr. 1887).
113. Mulier, supra note 7, at 42.
114. See id. at 41-42. In the mid-1800s, off reservation activity by Native Americans was
not welcome in many parts of the country, and was viewed with suspicion. S. REP. NO. 102–
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Despite this early ruling in their favor, “the tribes’ right of access to
customary fishing sites was routinely denied by Washington landowners
and state officials in subsequent decades.” 115
When Washington residents claimed the pre-statehood Taylor ruling no
longer applied post-statehood, the Yakama Nation was again forced to take
its treaty rights to court. 116 In United States v. Winans, 117 Washington
residents again wished to exclude Indians from their lands, reducing their
right to access fishing spots to that of any non-Indian who did not own the
property at issue. 118 The circuit court agreed, holding that “the treaty . . . did
not require private property owners to give access and use rights to Yakama
[treaty fisherman].” 119 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually ruled in favor of
the Indians. The Supreme Court held that the reserved rights “imposed a
servitude upon” certain private lands, regardless of future land
ownership. 120 This important usufructuary right 121 was in the nature of both
an easement 122 (a right to cross private land to reach the fishing places) and
“a piscary profit a prendre” (the right to go onto another’s land and remove
a resource, in this case, fish). 123 This reserved to the tribal members nonpossessory interests in the land, but not the fish themselves, which restrains
“unreasonable interferences” with the exercise of the profit.124

133, at 3 (1991) (citing a 1852 treaty between the United States and the Apache Nation
authorizing a reservation for the Native people and representing a change in federal Indian
policy to the reservation era as a “protective” measure).
115. Mulier, supra note 7, at 46.
116. Id. (citing United States v. Taylor, 44 F. 2 (C.C.S.D. Wash. 1890)).
117. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
118. Id. at 379.
119. Mulier, supra note 7, at 47.
120. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
121. See Michael R. Newhouse, Recognizing and Preserving Native American Treaty
Usufructs in the Supreme Court: the Mille Lacs Case, 21 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 169
(2000).
122. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 384 (holding that tribal members whose tribes signed
treaty possessed easement rights to reach fishing spots over private property).
123. Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, "Not Much Less Necessary . . . than the
Atmosphere They Breathed": Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court--A Centennial
Remembrance of United States v. Winans and Its Enduring Significance, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 489, 540 (2006).
124. See 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER
INTERESTS IN LAND § 839, at 429 (3rd ed. 1939); see also Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power
Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 811 (D. Idaho 1994) (holding that “the Tribe does not have a vested
property interest in a certain fixed quantity of fish in the annual fish runs . . . .”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 4.1, 4.3, 4.9 (2000).
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Though the technical meaning of these property rights could not have
been conveyed during treaty negotiations, 125 courts have properly looked
beyond the written words to the larger context that framed the treaty,
including “the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties.” 126 Examination of the historical
record provides insight into how the parties to the treaty understood the
terms of the agreement. 127 During the negotiations Governor Stevens said:
This [treaty] is such as a man would give to his children and I
will tell you why. This paper gives you a home. Does not a
father give his children a home? . . . This paper secures your
fish. Does not a father give food to his children? 128
Stevens understood the intent of the treaties and wrote that "[i]t never
could have been the intention of Congress that the Indians should be
excluded from their ancient fisheries.”129 Furthermore, Stevens wrote that it
was “inconceivable that either party deliberately agreed to authorize future
settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of their accustomed
places to fish.” 130
“The Indians were repeatedly assured that they would continue to enjoy
the right to fish as they always had, in the places where they had always
fished.” 131 “Negotiators specifically assured the tribes that they could
continue to fish notwithstanding the changes that the impending westward
expansion would certainly entail,”132 but Winans would not be the last time
that Washington State challenged the Indians’ right to fish under their
treaties. Tribal fishing rights would soon become the center of a long and
passionate battle between Washington and the Northwest tribes.

125. Miller, supra note 34, at 553-54; see also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 330, 355-56, 381 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that
the Chinook Jargon dictionary prepared by George Gibbs, Stevens' staff attorney, shows the
total absence of adequate words to convey the meaning of the treaties).
126. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
127. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195 (1999).
128. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 667 n.11 (1979) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 666 n.9 (quoting Letter from Isaac Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs (Sept. 16, 1854)).
130. Id. at 676.
131. United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1435 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
132. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 204 (W.D. Wash. 1980).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/3

No. 1]

STATE V. JIM: A NEW ERA?

117

III. Enemy of the State: A History of Washington and Its Tribes
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where
[Indian communities] are found are often their deadliest
enemies.
-Justice Miller 133
In Indian affairs, the United States has "charged itself with moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust" and the federal
government’s conduct is "judged by the most exacting fiduciary
standards." 134 The states owe no such duty. In fact, the states and the tribes
found within their borders have often operated on a “deadliest enemies
model,” 135 which finds its roots in “age-old, intergenerational enmity
between the people of Indian communities and the non-Indians who live on
or near Indian Country.” 136 This animosity “arose out of the often violent
conflict over limited resources” resulting from “westward migration . . . in
the 19th and early 20th centuries.” 137 The "deadliest enemies" “model of
mutual animosity forms the” foundation “of tribal-state relations to this
day.” 138 States and their citizens were engaged in an unrelenting effort “to
take Indian land and resources,” and eliminate Indian people altogether. 139
These disputes, often erupting between states (or more appropriately, their
citizens) and the tribes, sometimes turned deadly. 140 “State and local
governments on or near Indian Country . . . use[d] apparent legal authority
and simple force to dispossess Indian people of land and property,” even
using “taxing and police powers to exploit [the] tribes.” 141
133. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
134. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
135. “Much of the early history of federal Indian law and policy is framed by the
designation of states as the ‘deadliest enemies’ of Indians and Indian tribes.” Fletcher, supra
note 50, at 77.
136. Id. at 73.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 74.
139. Id. at 77.
140. Id. at 78.
141. Id.; see also JAMES A. CLIFTON ET AL., PEOPLE OF THE THREE FIRES: THE OTTAWA,
POTAWATOMI AND OJIBWAY OF MICHIGAN 34 (1986); JAMES M. MCCLURKEN, GAH-BAEHJHAGWAH-BUK, THE WAY IT HAPPENED: A VISUAL CULTURE HISTORY OF THE LITTLE
TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA 79 (1991); JAKE PAGE, IN THE HANDS OF THE GREAT
SPIRIT: THE 20,000-YEAR HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 277-78 (2003); JOHN TEBBEL &
KEITH JENNISON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS 24 (2001); Wenona T. Singel & Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 24-28 (2005).
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Until recently, the tribes and states “competed in a vigorous . . . zero-sum
game of civil regulation, taxation, and criminal jurisdiction,” and some state
still engage in such “legal and political warfare.” 142 “[L]ocal non-Indians
and the states were . . . overwhelmingly hostile to tribal interests,” and even
state congressmen and justices were not spared from the political pressure.
Those who supported the tribes sometimes risked losing their jobs. 143
Consequently, state courts were, and arguably are, a “potentially hostile
forum,” and Congress has recognized the hesitancy of tribes to use state
courts. 144 Washington State has been no exception.
A. Washington, Tribes, and Fish
Washington’s hostility toward the tribes is apparent when it comes to
treaty fishing rights and regulations. When the treaties were signed, and in
the decades following, the “‘right of taking fish’ was not a controversial
issue” due to a lack of non-Indian fisheries, declining Native American
populations, and abundant fish. 145 “There is no evidence that [either party to
the treaty] considered the possibility” of a collapse in the region’s
anadromous fish. 146 But in the following decades, the state was pressured
“to come down harder on the Indians” as the number of commercial
fishermen in the state exploded.147 “Stevens [had] anticipated that the right
to fish ‘would not in any manner interfere with the rights of citizens, and
was necessary for the Indians to obtain a subsistence,” but this turned out
not to be the case. 148
As fisheries developed and fish populations fell, Washington State, with
the support of the Washington State Supreme Court,149 began regulating
142. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 78.
143. See Tizon, supra note 65 (“[Congressman] Meeds . . . once highly popular [in
Washington], saw his constituency turn against him for his early support of the [tribal
fishing rights]. He decided not to run for a seventh term when it became clear he would lose.
Other lawmakers felt similar pressure.”).
144. Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights, 30 TULSA L.J. 61, 100-01
(1994) (“[State courts are] a potentially hostile forum, [which] ha[s] led to increasing use of
negotiated settlements.”); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 572
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Title 28, section 1362 of the United States Code “reflects a
congressional recognition of the ‘great hesitancy on the part of the tribes to use State
courts’” (citation omitted)).
145. Robinson, supra note 33, at 1.
146. Mulier, supra note 7, at 43.
147. Tizon, supra note 65.
148. Miller, supra note 34, at 555.
149. See, e.g., State v. Towessnute, 154 P. 805 (Wash. 1916) (upholding the right to
regulate Native Americans).
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off-reservation fishing despite the Stevens Treaties. 150 No sooner than
Washington became a state, it began to close down Indian fishing grounds,
eventually outlawing “net fishing in all rivers, except the Columbia.” 151 By
the 1940s, it became clear that the tribes would not enjoy any unique
fishing rights under Washington’s authority. 152 Though the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1942 limited Washington State’s ability to regulate treaty fishing
rights to those regulations “necessary for the conservation of fish,”153 this
did not stop the State from interfering significantly with Indian fishing
rights. As a result, the conflict reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s. 154
In the early 1960s, the State mounted raids on tribal fishermen that
would last for over a decade. 155 Washington State applied its fishing
regulations to treaty Indians, and “when Indian fishermen continued to fish
as normal, the State followed up with a law enforcement campaign
consisting mostly of ‘raids and stings’ designed to catch tribal fishermen”
on the rivers, 156 frequently seizing “Indian nets and equipment.” 157 The
Indians cited the Stevens Treaties in support of their position, however, the
state continued to regulate tribal fishing. 158 Washington viewed “Indian
fishermen as lawless, perverse, and as the causal reason for the decrease in
salmon runs.” 159 While “[n]on-Indian commercial fishers caught salmon by
the millions of tons in the Pacific and Puget Sound . . . the state blamed
declining fish runs on Indian netting and lawlessness,” which in reality
accounted for “less than 5 percent” of the total harvest.160 “[A]ll Indians
who dared defy the state” were viewed as “outlaws.” 161 “To survive [and]
continue their culture, [they] had to become an underground society.” 162
Washington increasingly allocated seasonal takes of fish to non-Indians,
effectively preserving the tribes’ right of access, while at the same time
ensuring that it was meaningless because most of the permissible catch
went to non-Indian fisherman. In the decades that followed, Indians faced
150. Robinson, supra note 33, at 1.
151. Tizon, supra note 65.
152. Fisher, supra note 5, at 499.
153. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942).
154. Miller, supra note 34, at 561.
155. WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 30-31.
156. Fisher, supra note 5, at 499-500.
157. Robinson, supra note 33, at 1.
158. Tizon, supra note 65.
159. Fisher, supra note 5, at 500.
160. Tizon, supra note 65.
161. Id.
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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endless harassment, threats, racist attacks, loss of property, and even
violence, in “what has become one of the most drawn out treaty disputes in
American history.” 163 For most of the twentieth century, non-Native
society “viewed [Indians] as a nuisance, a hindrance to progress.”164 “In the
Northwest, tribes were widely seen as poaching communities - lawless,
primitive, skulking around in the dark.” 165 In 1916, one Washington state
Supreme Court justice wrote, "The Indian was a child and a dangerous child
. . . . Neither Rome nor Britain ever dealt more liberally with their subject
races than we with these savage tribes, whom it was generally tempting and
always easy to destroy." 166
One U.S. Congressman from Washington equated the plight of the
Native Americans to the African American Civil Rights Movement, stating
that “[t]he fishing issue was to Washington state what busing was to the
East . . . . It was frightening, very, very emotional.” 167 A lack of
communication led to a “deep distrust” among the parties. 168 Eventually,
“Northwest Indians . . . began staging ‘fish-ins,’ in which protesters would
openly fish in defiance of state laws,” challenging the state’s ability to
regulate their treaty fishing rights.169 State officials “responded to the fishins with a military-style campaign, using surveillance planes, high-powered
boats and radio communications . . . [while] game wardens resorted to tear
gas . . . billy clubs,” and firearms. 170
Many “treaty fishing rights of [N]ative Americans have often been
preserved in the courts against violent opposition.” 171 Curbing executive
overstepping, “[f]ederal courts, applying special rules of construction, have
steadfastly upheld treaty promises against state recalcitrance.”172 The
famous “Boldt Decision” of 1974,173 was a major victory for the treaty
tribes of Washington state, allocating fifty percent of harvestable fish to the
163. Fisher, supra note 5, at 500.
164. Tizon, supra note 65.
165. Id.
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 329 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd and
remanded, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
169. Tizon, supra note 65.
170. Id.
171. Miller, supra note 34, at 543.
172. Id. at 563.
173. United States v. Washington (Boldt Decision), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash.
1974), aff’d in part sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/3

No. 1]

STATE V. JIM: A NEW ERA?

121

Native Americans, who made up just one percent of the state’s
population. 174 Such victories “did not come without widespread
resistance.” 175
When the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Boldt in 1975, 176 non-Indian
harvesters engaged in “widespread noncompliance” with the federal court's
orders. 177 The Washington Supreme Court supported this defiance by ruling
that “the state lacked authority to implement [the equal] sharing formula”–collaterally attacking the Boldt decision.178 “State agencies relied upon the
authority of the State court” to regulate fisheries in non-compliance with
the new federal guidelines established by Judge Boldt.179 The State of
Washington refused to accept the Boldt decision until the Supreme Court
reviewed the decision and affirmed in 1979. 180
It was one of “the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate
a decree of a federal court” of the twentieth century. 181 Washington’s
unprecedented resistance “forced the [federal] district court to take over a
large share of the management of the state's fishery in order to enforce its
decrees.” 182 As a last resort, Judge Boldt eventually took on the role of
“judicial ‘fishmaster.’” 183 He managed the Puget Sound and coastal
Washington fisheries himself, policing them via court orders, criminal
contempt citations, and federal marshals.184 “The ruling shocked the region,

174. Robinson, supra note 33, at 2. The Boldt decision also “established the locations of
the Tribes' usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . .” United States v. Washington,
157 F.3d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1998).
175. Blumm & Steadman, supra note 10, at 669.
176. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1086 (1976).
177. See BLUMM, supra note 36, at 81. Washington residents “hung” Judge Boldt in
effigy, created “Can Judge Boldt--Not Salmon” bumper stickers, and gathered 80,000
signatures on a petition supporting his impeachment. See Schartz, supra note 14, at 332.
178. BLUMM, supra note 36, at 81; see also Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 565
P.2d 1151 (Wash. 1977), vacated, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373 (Wash. 1977), vacated, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
179. Robinson, supra note 33, at 2.
180. Id.
181. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.
1978), vacated sub nom. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
182. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n, 573 F.2d at 1126.
183. Blumm & Steadman, supra note 10, at 699.
184. Fronda Woods, Who's in Charge of Fishing?, 106 OR. HIST. Q. 412, 432 (2005).
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and . . . resentment[] [over the case] continue[s]” today.185 And so continues
the court’s jurisdiction. 186
Overt anti-Native sentiment declined during the latter portion of the
twentieth century. 187 Legal developments have “stabilized the relations
between the states and Indian tribes, the federal government does just
enough to protect Indian tribes from state intervention, and there simply is
not much more Indian land and resources to acquire.” 188 But there is still
competition for jurisdictional and regulatory authority, and disputes can
sometimes be hard-fought. Jurisdiction and the tribal fishing rights again
became the center of conflict in State v. Jim.
B State v. Jim
The Yakama Tribe has been at the center of several of the most
significant court cases interpreting Indian treaty reserved fishing rights and
state jurisdiction in Indian Country, 189 and in State v. Jim, the tribe again
found itself in the middle of a significant case outlining its reserved treaty
fishing rights and tribal jurisdictional authority.
On June 25, 2008, Lester Ray Jim (“Jim”) “was cited by the State [of
Washington] for unlawfully retaining [five] undersized sturgeon,” which he
“incidentally caught [with] his gill net when fishing commercially,” and
“for unlawful use of a net” to take fish.190 Jim was fishing at the Maryhill
185. Tizon, supra note 65.
186. “The district court in Washington I reserved jurisdiction to hear future unresolved
issues arising out of the Treaties.” United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 641 (9th Cir.
1998).
187. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 81.
188. Id.
189. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (Yakima challenged
Washington’s use of Public Law 280); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (Supreme
Court overturned Washington conviction of Yakima tribal member for fishing without a
state license); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (discussing the Yakima
Nation’s right to access traditional fishing spots in Washington); Kittitas Reclamation Dist.
v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting rights
of the Yakima Nation to fisheries water pursuant to a federal consent decree awarding nonIndian irrigation rights); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969) (arrests of
Yakima fishers prompted court to order the state to recognize Indian fishing rights and allow
tribes to “participate meaningfully in the rule-making process”).
190. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 435 (Wash. 2012). Title 77, section 15.580 of the
Revised Code of Washington forbids the type of net fishing Jim engaged in. Brief of
Petitioner at 15, Jim, 273 P.3d 434 (No. 84716-9). Sturgeon are anadromous fish, which,
along with salmon and steelhead, are of particular interest to the Columbia River treaty
tribes. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, supra note 3, at v-vi.
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Treaty Fishing Access Site (“Maryhill”), which Congress set aside for use
by the Columbia River Treaty tribes, “to exercise their treaty fishing
rights.” 191 The state claimed criminal jurisdiction over the fishing site, but
the Washington Supreme Court, perhaps departing from its traditional
stance on tribal rights, ruled that the State lacked criminal jurisdiction.192
After catching the sturgeon (which can survive for several hours out of
water), “Jim took [them] ashore at Maryhill,” where “officers from the
Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife issued [him] a
citation.” 193 “Jim describe[d] it as the usual practice among Yakama
fishers” to bring sturgeon ashore, as they can survive for several hours out
of the water, and “that he planned to release [them].” 194 While “[t]ribal law
allows ‘[a]ll Yakama members . . . a reasonable opportunity to release alive
any sturgeon of prohibited length incidentally caught in authorized
fisheries,’” 195 Washington State law requires the “‘return [of] unauthorized
fish to the water immediately.’” 196 In order to determine which law would
govern Jim’s case, the court had to first decide if Washington had criminal
jurisdiction at the Maryhill site.
When the Bonneville Dam was constructed on the Columbia, it
“devastated” many of the accustomed fishing grounds of the Columbia
River tribes, including the Yakama. 197 In response, Congress set aside
several “in-lieu” fishing sites in 1945. 198 “Then, in 1988, Congress provided
for . . . improvement of existing in-lieu sites” and also set aside six new
treaty fishing access sites. 199 Maryhill was one of these sites. 200
191. Jim, 273 P.3d at 435. The Columbia River Treaty Tribes include the Nez Perce
Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes
of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakama Indian Nation. Member Tribes Overview, COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH
COMM’N, http://www.critfc.org/member_tribes_overview (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
192. Jim, 273 P.3d at 435.
193. Id. Jim was cited for violating title 77, section 15.580(1)(b) of the Revised Code of
Washington and former Washington Administrative Code section 220–32–05100W. Id.
194. Jim, 273 P.3d at 435.
195. Id. (quoting REVISED LAW & ORDER CODES OF YAKAMA NATION § 32.18.07(D)
(2009)).
196. Jim, 273 P.3d at 435 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.580(1)(b)(2013)).
197. Jim, 273 P.3d at 438 (citing State v. Sohappy, 757 P.2d 509 (Wash. 1988)).
198. “‘[S]uch lands . . . shall be subject to the same conditions, safeguards, and
protections as the treaty fishing grounds submerged or destroyed.’” Sohappy, 757 P.2d at
510 (quoting River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10, 22).
199. Jim, 273 P.3d at 438 (citing Indian Reorganization Act Amendments, Pub. L. No.
100–581, § 401, 102 Stat. 2938 (1988)). These new sites were also set aside in response to
the loss of accustomed sites due to dam construction on the Columbia and a resulting lawsuit
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“Jim challenged the State’s jurisdiction to prosecute him . . . at
Maryhill,” which federal regulations state is reserved exclusively for the
Columbia River tribes.201 The Klickitat County District Court agreed with
Jim, but on appeal the “superior court concluded that the state ha[d]
jurisdiction because [t]he Maryhill. . . site [was] not within the boundary of
the Yakama reservation.” 202 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding no state
jurisdiction, and in a 6-3 decision the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed. 203 Considering the history between Washington State and the
tribes and the statutes that govern criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country
this ruling by the Washington State Supreme Court is significant.
IV. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Congress has recognized that “[t]he tribes in the Northwest have a
unique place in the legal and regulatory scheme of natural resource
management[,]” due in part to “tribal sovereignty, treaty-reserved rights,
[and the] trust responsibility.” 204 Federal Indian law is said to be “sui
generis, or unlike any other area of the law,” and it is “new” “in the AngloAmerican context,” with no real equivalent and relatively “little guiding
precedent.” 205 Additionally, Indian tribes are a political and legal anomaly,
what Justice Kennedy calls "extraconstitutional"–-being outside the
structure of the constitution yet within U.S. borders. 206 Criminal jurisdiction
in Indian Country is complex and is informed by the relationship between
the tribes, the states, and the federal government.

filed by the Umatilla tribe. Jim, 273 P.3d at 438 (citing S. REP. NO. 100–577, at 44 (1988)).
200. Jim, 273 P.3d at 436.
201. Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 247.2(b), 247.3 (2014)).
202. Jim, 273 P.3d at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. at 436, 441.
204. Salmon in the Columbia River Basin: Review of the Proposed Recovery Plan:
Hearing on the Proposed Decision by the Federal Government to Recover Endangered
Salmonid Stocks in the Columbia River Basin Before the S. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife,
and Drinking Water, 106th Cong. 453 (1999) (Goals and Objectives of Tribal Fish
Restoration), available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/106s/59375.txt.
205. Fisher, supra note 5, at 514, 517-18; see also Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land
and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
1471, 1498.
206. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 213 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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A. The Federal/Tribal Relationship
The tribes have had a unique relationship with the U.S. federal
government since the birth of the nation.207 Through their ongoing
interaction with, and subjugation of, 208 the tribes, there is an “undisputed
existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the
Indian people” 209 and the federal government owes a strong fiduciary duty
to the tribes. 210 “This principle has long dominated the Government’s
dealing with the Indians,” 211 and is referred to as “one of the primary
cornerstones of Indian law.” 212
The federal government has not always embraced its trust obligations,
straining the limits of the trust responsibility in the modern era, and even
attempting to eliminate tribes. 213 “Indian tribes have [often] suffered at the
207. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823) (Under the
doctrine of discovery, tribes continued to have a use and occupancy right, but their
sovereignty was restricted in that they could only alienate their lands to the discovering
European nation.).
208. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-55 (1974).
209. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); see Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.
199, 236 (1974) (emphasizing “the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the
Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For general support and description of Federal trust relationship,
see Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship after Mitchell, 31
CATH. U. L. REV. 635 (1982).
210. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1984);
see also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225 ("[A] fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when . . .
[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present”); Seminole Nation v.
United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
211. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225.
212. FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK, 1982 ED.].
213. The Termination Act of 1945 “was by its terms ‘to provide for orderly termination
of Federal supervision over the property and members’ of the tribe.” Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408 (1968). Beyond the so-called “Termination Era,”
the United States continued to strain the trust relationship in more modern cases. See United
States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 501, 514 (2003) (explaining that despite the overt
breach of a common-law trustee's duties, the Secretary's action did not constitute a breach of
trust.); see also Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16, 18, 38 (D.D.C. 1999) (describing
federal treatment of the tribes as “breathtaking,” “egregious,” and “a shocking pattern of
deception” in light of its trust responsibility); Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 101-02
(2004) (The “Interior's . . . agencies have frequently been accused of sacrificing tribal
interests in favor of competing agency priorities,” engaging in behavior that “borders on the
shocking.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and
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hands of their ‘guardian,’ the United States government,” and many treaty
promises have been broken. 214 But the federal government is still more
often seen as an ally of the tribes, 215 especially as compared to the states in
which the tribes are found.
The federal government assumed very early on that it should control
Indian affairs, and consequently the state-tribal relationship should be
limited where possible, in order to enhance federal power and avoid the
violent conflict that often erupted between states and tribes. 216 A trust
responsibility arose from the plenary power Congress was granted in Indian
affairs in the U.S. Constitution,217 the many treaties made between the U.S.
and the Indian tribes, state enabling acts, 218 and the Trade and Intercourse
Act. 219
Due to the extent of “exclusive federal and tribal control in Indian
Country,” federal courts have created a “presumption . . . that state laws
have no force in Indian Country.” 220 Additionally, the purpose and history
of Trade and Intercourse Act 221 and the Indian Commerce Clause 222 provide
Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L. 437, 463-64 (2010).
214. Miller, supra note 34, at 544.
215. For example, “[t]hroughout the four decade-long United States v. Washington
proceedings, the federal government and the tribes [were] close allies.” Blumm &
Steadman, supra note 10, at 701.
216. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586-87 (1823). Felix Cohen further
emphasized a “bright-line rule that tribes and states could not mix.” Fletcher, supra note 50,
at 83 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 121 (1941)).
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress was granted the authority "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
This has been cited in recent cases as support for federal power in Indian affairs. See, e.g.,
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); United States v.
Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 1997). But see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
378-79 (1886) (Commerce clause did not give Congress additional powers over the tribes);
Miller, supra note 26, at 216 (“[T]he federal government owes a fiduciary/trust
responsibility to American Indian tribes and . . . voluntarily took on this duty by negotiating
treaties with tribes . . . .”).
218. Many western states, including Washington, had clauses in their enabling acts
stating that Indian lands within the borders of the state “shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.” Washington Enabling Act, ch.
180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889).
219. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012); see also Fletcher, supra note 50, at 83-84.
220. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 78 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959)).
221. Id. at 77 (“The first Congress' enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Acts,
prohibiting all forms of trade and interaction between Indians and others without federal
consent, is strong evidence of the intent to keep states away from Indian tribes”).
222. Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration of
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strong support for this conclusion. This rule was later articulated in
Worcester v. Georgia, 223 where Justice Marshall restated the original
understanding “that state law can have no force in Indian Country.” 224 As a
result, “absent congressional authorization,” state laws and regulations
generally do not have effect inside of Indian Country. 225
Additionally, Washington State’s enabling act reserves from Washington
any right to control lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribe.226
“Treaty rights are not impliedly terminated upon statehood,”227 and in the
Washington enabling act, Congress did not impliedly abrogate Indian treaty
rights. 228
Furthermore, through the treaty process, the federal government has
taken on certain responsibilities. These include the obligation to recognize
and preserve tribal hunting, fishing, and other usufructuary rights,229 such
as the ones at issue in State v. Jim.
B. Federal Criminal Statutes
The federal criminal justice framework in Indian Country is based
largely on three federal statutes.230 “The first . . . is 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which
defines no offenses but merely . . . defin[es] the term ‘Indian [C]ountry,’”
delineating federal jurisdiction.231 The second and third in this “series of

Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 22 n.54 (2004) (This constitutional clause
“was clearly and demonstrably intended to eliminate any claims of state authority to
negotiate with Indian tribes or to manage Indian affairs, even for tribes located within the
borders of that state.").
223. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
224. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 81 (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 540).
225. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.01[2], at 501 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005).
226. Washington Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889). Eleven western
states have provisions in their enabling acts that relinquish all jurisdiction over Indian land to
the federal government. Kurt Sommer, Ninth Circuit Rules That Disclaimer States Lack
Jurisdiction over Indian Water Rights Under the McCarren Amendment, 23 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 255, 255 (1983).
227. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207 (1999)
(citations omitted).
228. State v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1083 (Wash. 1999). But cf. State v. McCoy, 387
P.2d 942 (Wash. 1963) (the treaty fishing rights of Indians who were parties to the Treaty of
Point Elliott were impliedly abrogated by Washington's admission to the Union).
229. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 401 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
230. Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV.
709, 715 (2006).
231. Id.
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Congressional enactments . . . extend[ing] federal criminal jurisdiction into
Indian [C]ountry, without eliminating concurrent tribal jurisdiction,” are the
Indian Country Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1152) and the Major Crimes Act
(18 U.S.C. § 1153). 232
Sections 1151 and 1152 of title 18 are the most relevant for purposes of
State v. Jim, as the statutory definition of “Indian Country” determines the
scope of federal jurisdiction. Section 1152 provides that “the general laws
of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except
the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian [C]ountry.” 233 And
section 1151 defines “Indian Country” as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same. 234
Prior to 1953, Indians engaged in unlawful activity within Indian
Country were generally free from state jurisdiction. 235 Federal or tribal law
governed these offenses. 236 But since that date, which signifies the
enactment of Public Law 280, 237 “Congress and the [Supreme] Court have
imposed a number of restrictions on tribal jurisdiction, sometimes by
expanding state and federal jurisdiction into Indian [C]ountry.”238
232. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 46-47.
233. Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (emphasis added). “Indian allotments” and “dependent
Indian communities” are federally defined and do not apply to the Maryhill TFAS at issue in
State v. Jim. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 8.
235. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 470 (1979).
236. Id.
237. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(2012), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2012), & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)).
238. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 46; see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696-98
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C. State Jurisdiction and Public Law 280
In 1953, “Congress extended state jurisdiction into Indian [C]ountry with
the passage of Public Law 280, which gave [five] states extensive criminal
and civil jurisdiction over Indian Country” and authorized other states,
including Washington, to enact laws asserting jurisdiction.239 “Public Law
280 was later amended by Congress [in the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968] to require tribal consent to state jurisdiction in Indian [C]ountry.” 240
But by the time of the Public Law 280 amendment, Washington had
legitimately assumed some nonconsensual criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indian Country under section 37.12.010 of the Revised Code of
Washington (“RCW”). 241
In 1963, Washington revised section 37.12.010 and assumed criminal
jurisdiction:
over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and
lands . . . but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to
Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an
established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United
States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States . . . . 242
“While a tribe can consent to greater state jurisdiction,” 243 “the Yakama
Nation has never given its consent and is therefore only subject to the
nonconsensual jurisdiction asserted by the [s]tate in RCW 37.12.010.”244 In
(1990) (holding that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209-12 (1978) (stating tribes cannot criminally
prosecute non-Indians). “The Supreme Court has also recognized far-reaching limitations on
tribal jurisdiction . . . including the lack of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . [and
the] ability to prohibit hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation fee lands . . . .”
McCarthy, supra note 213, at 48.
239. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 46; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
240. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 437 (Wash. 2012); see also McCarthy, supra note 213, at
47; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a).
241. 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 346-47 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §
37.12.010 (2013)); see also Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 449, 502 (1979) (holding that WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 complies
with Public Law 280 and is constitutional).
242. 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 346-47 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §
37.12.010 (2013)).
243. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.021 (2013)).
244. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437; see also Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 465–66; For a
more detailed history of the Yakama’s opposition to Public Law 280 jurisdiction, see James
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State v. Jim, the state argued that RCW 37.12.010 can validly be read to say
that nonconsensual state jurisdiction extends to Indians unless they act:
(1) “within an established Indian reservation”; and
(2) “on their tribal lands or on allotted lands”; where
(3) such lands are “held in trust by the United States or subject to
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States.”245
Thus, the main issue in State v. Jim was whether the Maryhill Fishing
Access Site met one of these exceptions. If the court decided it did,
Washington would have no criminal jurisdiction at the site and Jim could
not be subjected to state regulation, but if it did not, Washington would
have criminal jurisdiction over the site and could prosecute Jim.
The Washington Supreme Court decided a similar issue before in State v.
Sohappy, 246 ruling that Washington had no jurisdiction at a similar “in-lieu”
fishing site. 247 The Sohappy court relied on a U.S. Supreme Court decision
that defined “Indian reservation” as land “validly set apart for the use of the
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government,” 248 and
concluded that although the “in-lieu” fishing site was not part of the
Yakama Reservation under the original 1855 treaty, it was “part of a
reservation for purposes of application of our state jurisdiction statute.” 249
The appellate court in State v. Jim relied solely on Sohappy in reaching the
conclusion that Maryhill was essentially an “in-lieu” fishing site, and
therefore, a “reservation” for the purposes of RCW 37.12.010–-putting it
beyond the state’s jurisdiction. 250
However, the Sohappy opinion failed analyze and apply the controlling
language of RCW 37.12.010 and thus to address the statute’s scope and
limits as to state criminal jurisdiction.251 Jim argued that “[u]nder the
principle of stare decisis, Sohappy controls.” 252 The state argued that
Sohappy had been superseded by two other cases--Cooper and Boyd

A. Bamburger, Public Law 280: The Status of State Legal Jurisdiction Over Indians After
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 15 GONZ. L.
REV. 133, 149-61 (1980).
245. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington at 7-8, Jim, 273 P.3d 434 (No.
84716-9).
246. 757 P.2d 509 (Wash. 1988).
247. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 190, at 1; Sohappy, 757 P.2d at 512.
248. Sohappy, 757 P.2d at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id. at 511-12.
250. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 4.
251. Id. at 4, 17.
252. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 190, at 16.
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(discussed below)--and that it “should be overruled” for failure to address
the statutory criteria.253
Though the state argued that none of the statutory criteria for exempting
a tribal member’s activity from state jurisdiction was met, the Washington
Supreme Court stretched the conventional understanding of each of these
criteria. The court ruled that each of the criteria discussed above was
present--a holding supported by Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)
regulations setting these sites aside for “exclusive use” by the tribes. 254
Departing from a century of state resistance, the court expanded tribal
government and protected Indian fishing rights by finding that all three
criteria had been met.
1. Tribal Lands or Allotted Lands?
The Maryhill TFAS is not allotted land. 255 Therefore, the site must be
“tribal land” in order to meet this criterion. The state challenged Jim’s
assertions that Maryhill is “Indian Country,” but conceded that Maryhill is
tribal land, making this the least controversial criterion for the RCW
37.12.010 exception in this case.256 Even absent the state’s admission, the
court found that the Maryhill site is tribal land because it was “reserved
exclusively for tribal members” pursuant to Bureau of Indian Affairs
regulations. 257 However, the court went on to analyze the other two criteria.
2. Held in Trust or a Restriction Against Alienation?
According to the state, the next criterion that Maryhill had to meet in
order to qualify for the RCW 37.12.010 exception required that the tribal
land be “held in trust by the United States or subject to restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States.” 258 In a 2001 case, a Washington
appellate court concluded that the state has jurisdiction over crimes
occurring within an Indian reservation, unless the land is also one of the
253. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 17.
254. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 440 (Wash. 2012). These findings are explained in detail
in the following three subsections.
255. Allotments of land “were deeded to individuals . . . under the provisions of various
treaties and the Dawes Act” from 1887-1934. State’s Response Brief at 24, Jim, 273 P.3d
434 (No. 84716-9); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
142 (1972) (an allotment is “a selection of specific land awarded to an individual allottee
from a common holding”).
256. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae at 18, Jim, 273 P.3d 434
(No. 84716-9); Jim, 273 P.3d at 437.
257. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437, 440.
258. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 8.
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types described in the statute–-i.e., lands held in trust or subject to a
restraint against alienation.259
Furthermore, “off-reservation fishing access sites [have always been]
owned in fee by the federal government or private landowners . . . .”260
“[L]ands held in fee are not lands ‘held in trust by the United States or
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States . . .
.’” 261 This means that RCW 37.12.010 gave Washington jurisdiction over
fee lands even when they are within Indian reservations.262 Even if the
tribes could show that Maryhill is a collective Indian reservation for the
four tribes, the state argued that it would still lack the remaining necessary
characteristics: it is not land held in trust, and it is not subject to a restraint
on alienation.263
The legislature never defined “held in trust” for purposes of RCW
37.21.010. 264 But the state argued that none of the fishing access sites were
acquired with congressional direction that it be placed in trust, nor was the
land subject to a restraint against alienation at any point in time. 265 The
federal government did not assume trust responsibility over the access sites
because doing so would have required express language by statute. 266
Furthermore, “Public Law No. 100-581, the statute [that] authorized federal
acquisition and management of the site,” contained no such language, and
therefore Maryhill was not under the federal government’s trust
responsibility. 267 Nor did anything in the BIA federal regulations state that
the land would be held in trust for any of the tribes.268

259. See State v. Boyd, 34 P.3d 912, 916 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Flett,
699 P.2d 774, 777 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (Washington State has jurisdiction over an Indian
committing a crime on reservation land that was not held in trust by the federal government
or restricted from alienation).
260. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at 2.
261. State v. Cooper, 928 P.2d 406, 408 n.4 (Wash. 1996).
262. Id.
263. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at 18.
264. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 14.
265. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 13.
266. Statement of Supplemental Authority at 1, State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434 (Wash. 2012)
(No. 84716-9) (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2325
(2011)).
267. Id. (citing Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 2938,
2944); see also Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 13.
268. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 13 n. 10
(citing 25 C.F.R. pt. 247 (treaty fishing access sites) & 25 C.F.R. pt. 248 (in-lieu fishing
sites)).
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In contrast, Jim argued that TFASs are “owned and controlled
exclusively by the United States in trust” and emphasized that non-Indians
were denied access. 269 Congress directed the Army Corps of Engineers “to
improve . . . the . . . sites and then transfer them to the Department of
Interior to be held in trust for the benefit of the tribes.”270 These tribes
included State v. Jim’s amici curiae tribes,271 who described themselves as
the “beneficial owners” of the Maryhill site.272 Jim further argued that “all .
. . necessary elements of an Indian trust [were] present” for purposes of
RCW 37.12.010, including “the trustee (United States), the beneficiaries
(the four Columbia River treaty tribes), and the trust corpus (Indian treaty
fishing sites, i.e. ‘trust property’).” 273 These necessary trust elements were
enumerated in United States v. Mitchell, 274 where the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that federal control or supervision of tribal properties normally
creates a “fiduciary relationship . . . even though nothing is said expressly in
the authorizing or underlying statute . . . about a trust fund, or a trust or
fiduciary connection.” 275 The 1988 statute, Jim argued, created a “trust”
even though it did not use express language. 276 He further argued that this
trust gives the tribes only “beneficial use,” creating a restraint on
alienation. 277
The Washington Supreme Court agreed with Jim, ruling that “Maryhill is
more like trust land or land with a restriction against alienation than fee
land.” 278 Again, the court based its “trust” holding on the fact that the land
was set aside “for exclusive use and benefit of the tribes . . . .”279 The court
agreed that a trust relationship can exist absent express words, and that all
the Mitchell elements of a trust were present. 280 Thus, the “in trust or
269. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 190, at 23.
270. Id. at 6 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-581, § 401(b)(2), 102 Stat. at 2944).
271. The amici tribes included all four of the Columbia River treaty tribes with rights to
Maryhill–-the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, the Nez Perce Tribe, and the
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation. Brief for Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Jim, 273
P.3d 434 (No. 84716-9).
272. Id.
273. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 10.
274. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
275. Id. at 225 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
276. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 11.
277. Id.
278. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 441 (Wash. 2012).
279. Id.
280. Id.
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subject to restraint on alienation” element of the RCW 37.12.010 exception
was present to prevent Washington from asserting jurisdiction.
However, the status of Maryhill as tribal land constructively held in trust
and with a restraint against alienation did not decisively remove it from the
state’s criminal jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court had
previously ruled that “Washington assumed full nonconsensual civil and
criminal jurisdiction over all Indian [C]ountry outside established Indian
reservations.” 281 The U.S. Supreme Court similarly described Washington’s
jurisdictional exclusion as one that applies to lands within Indian
reservations. 282 And even “[a]llotted or trust lands are not excluded from
full nonconsensual state jurisdiction unless they are ‘within an established
Indian reservation.’” 283 Ultimately, the “case turn[ed] . . . on whether
Maryhill is an established reservation.” 284
3. Is Maryhill a Reservation?
The federal definition of “Indian Country” is somewhat flexible and
open to debate. 285 The tribes claimed that they have jurisdiction over
Maryhill because it is Indian Country, but the state refused to concede this
issue. 286 However, the state did admit that “the Maryhill site may be Indian
[C]ountry” because it was “arguably set aside for the use of Indians” and it
is “under the superintendence of the federal government.” 287 Based on that
admission, Jim argued that the state had “conceded that [Maryhill] is within
Indian Country,” and “[b]ecause . . . ‘Indian [C]ountry’ is defined by
federal statute and case law, the [s]tate [could not] logically maintain that
the site is not an ‘Indian reservation.’” 288
But even if Maryhill is “Indian Country,” that does not automatically
place it beyond Washington’s jurisdiction under the express terms of the
statute. 289 The state argued a straightforward application of RCW 37.12.010
would grant it jurisdiction. 290 The court of appeals ruled that Maryhill is
281. State v. Cooper, 928 P.2d 406, 408 (Wash. 1996) (emphasis added); see also WASH.
REV. CODE § 37.12.010.
282. Cooper, 928 P.2d at 409 (emphasis added) (citing Washington v. Confederated
Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 475 (1979)).
283. Cooper, 928 P.2d at 408 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 37.12.010).
284. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437.
285. See Washburn, supra note 230, at 715.
286. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at 18.
287. Id. at 16.
288. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 7.
289. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at 18.
290. Id. at 1.
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“entitled to reservation status,” apparently because it is within “Indian
Country.” 291 But the Washington Supreme Court had already held in
Cooper that it was “not appropriate to utilize federal conceptions of ‘Indian
[C]ountry’ to construe a portion of a [s]tate statute placing a limitation on
the otherwise broad assertion of [s]tate jurisdiction over all of Indian
[C]ountry.” 292
The very purpose of RCW 37.12.010 is to assert Washington’s broad
jurisdiction over certain portions of Indian Country, with a narrow
exception. 293 The exception requires that the land, among other
requirements, be tribal land or allotted land. But Washington’s assumption
of jurisdiction excluded only narrow portions of “tribal lands” and “allotted
lands” (the second criterion listed in RCW 37.12.010)--those “within [an]
established . . . reservation[].” 294 Despite the Washington Supreme Court’s
holding, “[t]he Maryhill site meets none of these criteria.”295
“The term ‘Indian reservation’ is not defined by statute” 296 and is a term
of art that first appeared in the Major Crimes Act, later to be replaced by the
“statutorily defined term ‘Indian [C]ountry.’” 297 “At one point . . . ‘Indian
reservation’ referred to land tribes reserved for themselves . . . by treaty,”
and to “which they never extinguished title.”298 The tribes argued that
modern definitions include “federally protected Indian land regardless of
origin,” and that “land . . . held in trust . . . is a reservation for purposes of
criminal jurisdiction.” 299 Thus, the courts were left to determine whether
Congress intended to make the Maryhill site an Indian reservation, and if
so, which definition would be most appropriate.300
In 1945, in response to the devastation of many of the “usual and
accustomed places” for the Yakama and other Indian treaty fishing tribes,

291. State v. Jim, 230 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
292. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 19 (citing
State v. Cooper, 928 P.2d 406, 407 (Wash. 1996)).
293. Id. at 15.
294. Id. at 8-9; State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at
16.
295. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 9.
296. State v. Sohappy, 757 P.2d 509, 511 (Wash. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Brief for Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 271, at 10.
298. Id. (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 269 (1913)).
299. Id. at 11 (citing United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978)).
300. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 6.
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Congress first created several “in-lieu” fishing sites. 301 These lands were set
aside “subject to the same conditions, safeguards, and protections as the
[original] treaty fishing grounds submerged or destroyed.” 302 Then, in 1988,
Congress provided for the establishment of at least six additional treaty
fishing access sites, as well as the improvement of existing in-lieu sites. 303
Maryhill is one such treaty fishing access site. Congress indicated that these
newer “treaty fishing access sites” (TFASs) were to be created and treated
consistently with the existing in-lieu sites and that they were “for the
permanent use and enjoyment of the Indian tribes.” 304
The Maryhill site is designed to function like any pre-existing “in-lieu”
site, which were designed to have the same protections as the original usual
and accustomed fishing sites. But the term “usual and accustomed fishing
spots” has been used almost synonymously with “off reservation fishing
sites.” “[T]he tribes reserved [for] themselves . . . the right of taking fish ‘in
common with’ non-Indians at off-reservation ‘usual and accustomed’
fishing sites” or “customary off-reservation fishing sites.” 305 As far back as
Winans, courts recognized an “exclusive right of fishing reserved within
certain boundaries” (i.e. the reservations), and “[t]here was a right outside
of those boundaries reserved ‘in common with citizens of the territory.’” 306
Winans recognized an imposed servitude over private lands in order to
fulfill the reserved treaty right to fish, but with the limitation that the fishing
clause could only be understood to reserve a “right to use customary offreservation fishing sites in [a similar] manner [as] they had always
enjoyed.” 307
Furthermore, “every fishing location where members of a tribe
customarily fished . . . is a usual and accustomed ground or station at which
301. See Sohappy, 757 P.2d at 510. These sites were flooded during construction of
dams, which have enjoyed a special status in the Northwest, although highly disruptive to
Native American fishing rights. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam,
Imposing Judicial Restraints on the "Art of Deception": The Courts Cast A Skeptical Eye on
Columbia Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47 (2008).
302. Sohappy, 757 P.2d at 510 (citing River and Harbor Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79–14,
§ 2, 59 Stat. 10, 22 (1945)).
303. S. REP. NO. 100–577, at 30-31, 43 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3908, at
3920-21, 3933.
304. Id. at 43, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3933(emphasis added).
305. Mulier, supra note 7, at 41-42.
306. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
307. Mulier, supra note 7, at 48-49. In Winans, the Supreme Court upheld the Indians'
right of access over private property in order to fish in the Columbia River. See Winans, 198
U.S. at 384.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/3

No. 1]

STATE V. JIM: A NEW ERA?

137

the treaty tribe reserved, and its members presently have, the right to
fish.” 308 Because this includes land outside of their “ceded territory,” 309
historically the fear was that Indians would be able to claim that any spot on
the river was a usual and accustomed fishing place, essentially creating an
easement on the whole river–-not just the reservation.310 The “Indians were
given a right in the land[]--the right of crossing it to the river[]--the right to
occupy it to the extent and for the purpose mentioned.”311 “The federal
development of fee owned lands as mitigation for the inundation of fee
owned access sites utilized by multiple tribes with off-reservation fishing
rights,” the state argued, “does not constitute the establishment of an Indian
reservation . . . .” 312 “[T]he Yakama treaty distinguishes between fishing
within the reservation and fishing ‘at all usual and accustomed places,’
which are clearly not within the reservation.”313
This distinction between reservation land and off-reservation “usual and
accustomed” fishing spots is important because within their reservations
tribal members have a heightened “interest in being free of state police
power.” 314 But “[c]ongressional reports explicitly recognize state and local
jurisdiction at . . . federally owned [access fishing] sites.” 315
These fishing sites were historically thought to be outside of Indian
Country, or at the very least off reservation.316 And the Washington
Supreme Court, in State v. Cooper, 317 had rejected the argument that land
held in trust “is functionally an established Indian reservation,”318 an
“interpretation [that] would render the phrase ‘within an established Indian
308. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 332 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
309. Mulier, supra note 7, at 50 (citing Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194
(1919)).
310. Id. at 46.
311. Id. at 49.
312. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 13.
313. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 443 (Wash. 2012) (Wiggins, J., dissenting); see also
Treaty with the Yakima Nation, supra note 8, at 954.
314. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463, 502 (1979).
315. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 14 (citing
S. REP. NO. 100-577, at 3935 (1988)). But when the BIA made regulations governing TFASs
they stated that “States do not have regulatory jurisdiction or authority over the in-lieu
fishing sites.” 62 Fed. Reg. 50866, 50867 (Sept. 29, 1997) (codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 247).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing tribal
water rights for fisheries purposes even though the protected fishing places were located
outside Indian Country).
317. 928 P.2d 406, 409-10 (Wash. 1996).
318. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 11.
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reservation’ totally meaningless.” 319 In rejecting that argument, the Cooper
court said that “[i]f the term ‘reservation’ in RCW 37.12.010 included all
Indian lands outside the formal boundaries of established reservations, then
the exception would swallow the rule.” 320 Then, 14 years later, in the State
v. Jim litigation, even the court of appeals, which ruled that Maryhill was
part of Indian Country and “entitled to reservation status,” still
acknowledged that the site is “not on an Indian reservation” and “not on
Yakama reservation land.” 321
If the Maryhill site does not appear to meet the criteria of a
“reservation,” it would appear that Washington State would have
jurisdiction over the site, as only tribal land or allotted land on a reservation
would be reserved for tribal jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court
disagreed.
4. Exclusive Use
The “exclusive use” analysis was complicated by the regulations, which
the BIA promulgated to regulate the new fishing sites, including Maryhill.
When Congress provided for the creation of Maryhill TFAS and other sites
in 1988, it “directed the [Army] Corps of Engineers to . . . improve the[] . . .
sites . . . [and then] transfer [them] to the [BIA] for continued
maintenance.” 322 The BIA regulates use of Columbia River treaty fishing
access sites, in-lieu fishing sites, and off-reservation treaty fishing. 323 The
primary purpose of Public Law 100-577 (creating Maryhill) was to fulfill
treaty obligations by authorizing “acquisition of additional sites from
willing sellers” in order to improve Indian access, “ease tensions” with the
non-Indian fisherman, and to “ease overcrowding of access sites by
fishermen and recreationists along the Columbia River . . . .” 324 The
congressional legislation did not state that the lands are to be managed
exclusively for the tribes. 325 However, in 1997 the BIA promulgated
319. Cooper, 928 P.2d at 410.
320. Id. (emphasis added).
321. State v. Jim, 230 P.3d 1080, 1081-83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 273 P.3d 434
(Wash. 2012).
322. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 3. This
same arrangement was established for the “in-lieu” fishing sites, where the Corps acquired
over 400 acres of land to ultimately be administered by the BIA for the “permanent use and
enjoyment of the tribes.” S. REP. NO. 100-577, at 43 (1988).
323. 25 C.F.R. pt. 241 (2014); id. pt. 247 (access sites); id. pt. 248 (in-lieu sites); id. pt.
249 (off-reservation fishing).
324. S. REP. NO. 100-577, at 22.
325. See Act of November 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 2938.
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regulations stating that the use of the land was reserved exclusively for
enrolled members of the treaty tribes.326
This exclusivity is important. The original fishing sites lost to dam
construction were “usual and accustomed places,” which were to be
enjoyed "in common with [all] citizens[] of [the] Washington Territory." 327
But creating exclusive treaty fishing access sites does not appear to be
justified or required based on the 1855 treaty language itself. The words “in
common with” should theoretically limit the rights enjoyed at in-lieu sites,
and therefore, at Maryhill. Even where fishing rights are reserved, “any
tribal right to fish on the ceded, off-reservation lands can no longer be
‘exclusive.’” 328
But the fact that these sites are set aside exclusively for the tribes left the
door open for a different interpretation. 329 The court in State v. Jim noted
that “[t]here is something fundamentally different about land that is set
aside for the exclusive use of tribes . . . .” 330 In fact, where fishing or
hunting rights are reserved in an area exclusively for Indians, courts have
sometimes assumed they are being exercised on a reservation, because “no
exclusivity would be possible on lands open to non-Indians.” 331 Indian
tribes possess inherent sovereign powers, including the authority to
exclude. 332 “A tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to
condition their presence on the reservation is . . . well established.” 333
Though a tribe’s power to exclude exists independently of its general
jurisdictional authority, 334 the Washington Supreme Court found it was
strong evidence that Congress intended Maryhill to be a reservation.
The tribes argued that because Maryhill is managed by the federal
government “to fulfill treaty obligations,” it should be a reservation by
definition, despite the fact that the treaty right being supported is an offreservation fishing right. 335 The state argued that to be an “established
326. 25 C.F.R. §§ 247.2(b), 247.3 (2014.
327. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1968).
328. Or. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 768-69 (1985).
329. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 440 (Wash. 2012) (“Maryhill is different from other
usual and accustomed fishing sites because it is reserved exclusively for tribal use and not
shared in common with other citizens.”).
330. Id.
331. See, e.g., Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. at 767.
332. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982).
333. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) (emphasis
added).
334. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696-97 (1990).
335. Brief for Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation et al. as Amici
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Indian reservation” the land must be communal tribal land established as
tribal reservation homeland. 336 The U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of
“Indian reservation” is land “validly set apart for the use of the Indians as
such, under the superintendence of the government.” 337 Federal decisions
have also noted that reservations include not just aboriginal lands set aside
in treaties, but also lands “set apart as an Indian reservation out of the
public domain, and not previously occupied by . . . Indians.” 338 Jim argued
that the Maryhill TFAS met this definition of a reservation, and because the
Major Crimes Act extended federal jurisdiction into “Indian Country”
(which includes “all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation”), the
site was under federal and not state control. 339
Ultimately, the court concluded that Maryhill is an “established Indian
reservation[,] held in trust” for the tribe’s benefit, and that state criminal
jurisdiction was therefore excluded. 340 To the court’s credit, the original
treaty with the Yakama said that land
shall be set apart and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked
out, for the exclusive use and benefit of said confederated tribes
and bands of Indians, as an Indian reservation; nor shall any
white man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian
Department, be permitted to reside upon the said reservation
without permission of the tribe and the superintendent and
agent. 341
The court stated that the “principal test” for determining reservation
status is “whether the land in question had been validly set apart for the . . .
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government” 342 and that a
“plain reading of the statute and consideration of the character of the land

Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 271, at 1, 14-15.
336. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 11, 13.
337. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914).
338. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 268-69 (1913).
339. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 7-8 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)
(2012)).
340. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 441 (Wash. 2012).
341. Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, supra note 8,
at 953.
342. Jim, 273 P.3d at 439 (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted). But the fact that the lands in John were clearly held in
trust, and later declared a reservation by proclamation did not seem to factor into the court’s
analysis.
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indicates that Maryhill is a reservation.” 343 In order to arrive at the
conclusion that Maryhill is a reservation, the court cited to several broad
dictionary definitions for “reservation,” including “[a] tract of public land
that is not open to settlers but is set aside for a special purpose; esp., a tract
of land set aside for use by indigenous peoples” 344 and “a tract of public
land set aside for a particular purpose (as schools, forest, or the use of
Indians).” 345
Despite the lack of express language, the court ruled that Maryhill was a
reservation. 346 This holding was based largely on the fact that “[b]y law, the
[Maryhill access] land must ‘be administered to provide access to usual and
accustomed fishing areas’ for four tribes,” 347 and more importantly that
“[f]ederal regulations make clear that the right of use is reserved exclusively
for the named tribes.” 348 According to the court, this was enough to indicate
that Congress had, more than a century after the treaty, “clearly” and
effectively extended the Yakama reservation when it established
Maryhill: 349
While the treaty between the federal government and the
Yakama Nation reserves and defines the boundaries of one large
tract of land, there is no indication in the law that “reservation”
means only a specific tribe's original treaty reservation. The
[s]tate jurisdictional statute does not specify how or when the
reservation of land must be established. 350

343. Jim, 273 P.3d at 438.
344. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (9th ed. 2009)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
345. Jim, 273 P.3d at 438 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1930 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
346. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437-38.
347. Id. at 436 (quoting Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-581, § 401(a)-(b), 102 Stat.
2938, 2944).
348. Jim, 273 P.3d at 436 (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 247.2(b), 247.3 (2014)). Recall that the
“exclusive” aspect was only added after the fact via BIA regulations, not congressional
mandate. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 247.2(b), 247.3 (2014). But the BIA had created similar
“exclusivity” requirements in 1967 for the “in-lieu” sites, of which Congress presumably
had notice before creating the TFASs. See 25 C.F.R. § 248.2. In Jim, the court implied that
this signaled congressional intent to set the new sites aside for exclusive tribal use. See 273
P.3d at 437, 440.
349. Jim, 273 P.3d at 438.
350. Id.
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“[L]and constitutes [the] single most valuable economic asset” for most
Indian tribes, 351 and “one of the most controversial aspects of federal policy
with respect to Indian lands is that of acquiring lands for tribes.”352 Land
can be taken into trust for Native Americans through several methods.353
The primary method for taking land into trust for tribes is through general
discretionary authority of the Secretary of the Interior, who may also
“proclaim that lands acquired in trust for a tribe become part of that tribe's
reservation.” 354 The “BIA land acquisition policy states: Land not held in
trust or restricted status may only be acquired for an individual Indian or a
tribe in trust status when such acquisition is authorized by an act of
Congress.” 355 However, “[u]nlike other federal legislation” acquiring lands
for the tribes, “Congress did not direct that the [Maryhill access site (and
other sites established in 1988)] be placed in trust for any tribe, nor have
any sites been designated a[s] part of any established Indian reservation”
for any of the tribes involved. 356 Nevertheless, the court in State v. Jim
reasoned that “Maryhill would be considered a reservation for purposes of
federal jurisdiction,” because it was meant to have the same legal status as
the “in-lieu” sites, which the Sohappy court had concluded qualified as a
“reservation.” 357
“[T]he fishing clause [in the 1855 Treaty] was meant to accommodate
the tribe’s fishing-based economies and cultures to the new circumstances
unfolding around the Yakama people,” including the arrival of millions of
American settlers into ceded tribal territories. 358 “[I]t is accordingly
inconceivable that either [Stevens or the tribes] deliberately agreed to
351. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
352. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 57.
353. Note that land can also lose its trust status, such as through disestablishment or
diminishment. “Disestablishment” refers to termination of the entire reservation. See
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999). “Diminishment”
occurs when only a discrete portion of a reservation loses its reservation status. See id.
Congressional intent to diminish a reservation can be inferred by the court. McCarthy, supra
note 213, at 48.
354. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 57-58 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 465, 467 (2012)). “Most
appeals from [these] decisions . . . come from [states] that fear a loss of jurisdiction . . . .”
Id. at 61. “Federal courts have frequently been asked to find that 25 U.S.C. § 465 is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority,” but the United States Supreme Court
has upheld it as constitutional. Id. at 58.
355. Id. at 59.
356. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 3.
357. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 440 (Wash. 2012)
358. Mulier, supra note 7, at 49.
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authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any meaningful use of
their accustomed places to fish.” 359 This would presumably include
inundation of traditional fishing spots from dam construction, as well as
crowding by non-Indian fisherman. The Maryhill site was established to
address both of these issues. 360 But to claim that Congress intended the
fishing sites to be a reservation is a stretch; the Washington Supreme Court
was not forced to arrive at this conclusion.
In theory, the Maryhill site should be of the same nature as the original
“usual and accustomed fishing places,” none of which were within the four
tribes’ communal Indian reservations. 361 Instead, the court cited to broad
dictionary definitions of “reservation” and the notion of exclusive use,
ruling that “while Maryhill is not the Yakama Indian Reservation, it is
nonetheless an area of land reserved for the exclusive use of four named
tribes, making it an Indian reservation.” 362 Thus, the BIA regulations
effectively made Indian reservations where none had existed before.
Though this falls in line with federal canons of construction, state courts
have historically been more likely to find no ambiguity at all in order to
support state interests. The three justices that dissented in State v. Jim found
that there was no ambiguity because there was only one reasonable
interpretation of the statute at issue. 363
Additionally, policy considerations seem to cut against exclusive tribal
criminal jurisdiction at these fishing sites. For example, the Supreme Court
had previously ruled that the federal government had jurisdiction over
Indians committing crimes on land patented in fee to non-Indians within
reservations, 364 reasoning that conditioning criminal jurisdiction on land
ownership would create an “impractical pattern of checkerboard
jurisdiction,” which would be unworkable. 365 Though not directly
applicable in State v. Jim, this reasoning would seem to cut against tribal
jurisdiction because excluding state criminal jurisdiction at the many

359. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 676 (1979).
360. S. REP. NO. 100–577, at 44 (1988) (sites were set aside in response to dam
construction on the Columbia); S. REP. NO. 100-577, at 22 (one of the purposes for the new
sites was to ease overcrowding).
361. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 9.
362. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 438 (Wash. 2012).
363. Id. at 442 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
364. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
365. Id.
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TFASs would create a similar checkerboard problem-–one compounded by
the fact that no one tribe has exclusive jurisdiction at any site.366
The Washington Supreme Court, while stretching to find the three
criteria that the state’s statutory interpretation demanded, also indicated that
there may be an alternative interpretation that would lead to the same
conclusion. Jim had argued throughout that RCW 37.12.010 was not as
straightforward as the state claimed, and that the ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the tribes. 367 The statute, Jim urged, should be
construed
“liberally”
and
“broadly”
for
the
tribes
consistent with federal Indian law principles.”368
The Washington Supreme Court seemed to agree, stating its belief that
RCW 37.12.010 was open to a very different reading than that which the
state had given it. The court stated that another “potentially legitimate, plain
reading” of the statute was that state “assumption of jurisdiction shall not
apply to Indians when on their tribal lands or [on] allotted lands within an
established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United States or
subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States.” 369
Under this reading, any Indian on his/her tribal lands would be outside the
state’s criminal jurisdiction, and that would be the end of the inquiry.
Because of the “exclusive use” aspect, Maryhill is considered tribal land
and would be outside the state’s jurisdiction. Since the court reached the
same conclusion based on the state’s reading of the statute, this alternative
interpretation was not necessary. 370 In either case, the court found that
Washington had no criminal jurisdiction over these tribal fishing sites. This
ruling marks a strong departure from the anti-Indian fishing campaign that
dominated the last 100 years of Washington’s tribal relations.
D. Washington Fishing Regulations and Conservation Necessity
Even if Washington had criminal jurisdiction over the Maryhill site
under RCW 37.12.010, it would still have additional hurdles to overcome
before it could successfully regulate Jim’s sturgeon fishing. According to
an order of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,

366. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 15-16.
367. Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 21, at 9-10.
368. Id. at 10.
369. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 437 n.3 (Wash. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing WASH.
REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2013)).
370. Jim, 273 P.3d at 437 n.3.
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Because the right of each [t]reaty [t]ribe to take anadromous fish
arises from a treaty with the United States, that right is preserved
and protected under the supreme law of the land, does not
depend on state law, is distinct from rights or privileges held by
others, and may not be qualified by any action of the [s]tate.371
Both Public Law 280 and RCW 37.12.060 recognize this limit on
Washington’s regulatory power, and expressly state that nothing in the
statute:
shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community
of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal
treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or
fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.372
But where the tribe “expressly reserved” the right to fish “on the ceded
lands,” it does not eliminate “the [s]tate's power to reasonably and
evenhandedly regulate such activity.” 373 Indian treaty fishing rights are not
irreconcilable with state management. While the “tribes ha[ve] a special
treaty right to fish on and off the reservation . . . a state can regulate the
manner of fishing in the interest of conservation.”374 This principle finds its
roots in the state sovereignty context, allowing state regulation of Indian
treaty rights even though states do not otherwise possess Congress's
authority to qualify treaty rights.375 Though only Congress can abrogate or
diminish treaty rights, 376 which it must do clearly and explicitly, exclusive
tribal jurisdiction would not make sense where, as here, the right to fish was
reserved “in common with” citizens of the territory–-implicating state and
federal interests. 377 Commonly known as the “conservation necessity”
standard, this principle “accommodates both the [s]tate’s interest in
management of its natural resources and the [tribe’s] federally guaranteed
treaty rights.” 378 The state argued in State v. Jim that the “savings
371. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 407 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd and
remanded, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
372. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.060 (2013); see also
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1968).
373. Or. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 768-69 (1985).
374. Miller, supra note 34, at 561; see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 205 (1999).
375. See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 205.
376. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412-13.
377. United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1985).
378. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. at 205.
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provisions in [Public Law 280 and RCW 37.12.060] do not preempt state
regulation;” instead, they simply preserve the existing balance between
conservation necessity and tribal fishing rights. 379
Assuming that Washington had criminal jurisdiction, “the manner of
fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the
like may be regulated by the [s]tate in the interest of conservation, provided
the regulation meets appropriate standards . . . .” 380 Essentially the
“conservation necessity” standards require that (1) state laws must be
“reasonable and necessary” for the conservation of species; (2)
“conservation . . . cannot be achieved by reasonable regulation of nonIndian activities” alone; (3) the law at issue is the “least restrictive
alternative . . . to achieve the . . . conservation purpose[s]”; (4) it “does not
discriminate against Indian activities”; and (5) “voluntary tribal
[conservation] measures are [in]adequate to achieve the . . . conservation
purpose.” 381
“While Indian tribes must face some regulation of their treaty rights,”
state regulations face “close judicial scrutiny.”382 “[T]he [s]tate simply
cannot by its own statute assume criminal jurisdiction to enforce state
fishing laws against enrolled Yakama members exercising their treaty
fishing rights.” 383 Treaty fishing rights are a valid defense to prosecution. 384
Consequently, the state was eager to frame State v. Jim as a criminal
jurisdiction case, and “not a fishing rights case.”385 The state asserted that
State v. Jim required the same jurisdictional analysis as a “property crime,
379. State’s Response Brief, supra note 257, at 9 (citing Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816).
380. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (emphasis added).
381. American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the
Endangered Species Act, U.S. DEP’TS OF COMMERCE AND INTERIOR, 6 (Secretarial Order No.
3206, June 5, 1997), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/appendix_f-j.pdf;
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship:
The Tribal Rights–Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1071-72
(1997); see also State v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1081 (Wash. 1999).
382. Miller, supra note 34, at 563 (emphasizing that the Washington Supreme Court held
that the state courts have no jurisdiction to regulate fishing activities on the reservation, and
that, in any event, the limitation on the steelhead catch is not a necessary conservation
measure); see also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1977).
383. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 190, at 28.
384. See State v. Courville, 676 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (emphasizing
that Indian fisherman may assert treaty rights as a defense in game violation prosecution).
385. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 3 n.2. In
fact, Jim challenged the state regulations under conservation necessity at the trial court level,
but the state failed to file any brief in response to this challenge. Supplemental Brief of
Respondent, supra note 21, at 2 n.1.
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an assault, or a drug crime” occurring at the same site.386 Although Jim
alleged that the “state was preempted from regulating” his fishing activity,
the state claimed that this was “an affirmative defense to state criminal
charges,” and that it should not be considered outside of “a trial on the
merits.” 387 The Washington Supreme Court agreed.388
Though the Yakama Treaty preempts some state fishing regulations,
nondiscriminatory fishing regulations necessary for the conservation of
fishery resources can be applied against treaty Indians at their “usual and
accustomed fishing sites.” 389 Because the Yakama Nation also has the right
to regulate fishing by its members, 390 a system has been developed for
federally supervised joint regulation per United States v. Oregon. 391 The
regulation that Washington sought to enforce against Jim was a result of
this collaborative process, 392 but the court never reached the question of its
validity under the conservation necessity standard.
One of the most surprising aspects of this case was not that Jim’s
activities were ultimately found to be beyond state regulatory authority, but
rather that the Washington Supreme Court seemed to bend over backwards
to meet the criteria advanced by the state for the jurisdictional exception.
The court could have easily ruled for the state, as one might have predicted
based on its precedent, allowing the prosecution to move forward, and
forcing the state to prove conservation necessity. It also could have based
its ruling on its own “potentially legitimate” reading of RCW 37.12.010–resting its decision simply on Maryhill’s status as “tribal land.” But instead,
by basing its ruling on broad jurisdictional interpretations, the court ruled
definitively in favor of the tribes. The ruling is not only a victory for tribal
treaty fishing rights, but also a victory for tribal sovereignty.

386. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner State of Washington, supra note 245, at 3 n.2.
387. Id.
388. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 437 n.2 (Wash. 2012).
389. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1968); Sohappy v. Smith,
302 F. Supp. 899, 910 (D. Or. 1969).
390. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 236 (9th Cir. 1974).
391. State’s Response Brief, supra note 257, at 14-15.
392. Id. at 14-15. The Yakama Nation is a signatory to the 2008 United States v. Oregon
Management Agreement acknowledging that state and tribes have overlapping jurisdiction in
this area. Id. at 15 n.8.
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V. Future Implications
“[T]he treaty rights of Northwest Indian tribes are [the] stronge[st]” they
have been in the past 100 years. 393 After State v. Jim, the tribes are even
more secure in their right to fish and self-regulate. In ruling for the tribes,
the Washington Supreme Court has upheld-–and in fact expanded-–tribal
sovereignty. The Washington court would not have produced a ruling like
this one thirty years ago, and it is questionable whether the U.S. Supreme
Court would have ruled so clearly in the tribe’s favor. 394 The court’s protribal ruling may represent another step in the changing tides of the
Washington State-Tribal relationship.
State v. Jim is a clear and welcomed departure from the “states as
enemies” model, which historically has dominated Washington’s
relationship with the tribal governments. This recent victory, combined
with the growing trend of tribal self-determination supported by both
federal and state governments, leaves new room for increased tribal
autonomy and self-regulation. 395 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld “the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them,” 396 and the designation of hundreds of additional acres as
“reservation land” has numerous implications for tribal sovereignty.
The designation of Maryhill and other fishing sites as “reservations” has
implications for state water rights and water quality, the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”), and state fishing regulations.397 But among the most
393. Miller, supra note 34, at 563.
394. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Legal Culture War Against Tribal
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 102 (2007).
395. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d
737, 744 n.7 (8th Cir. 1993).
396. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
397. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 717-18 (1978) (holding that water
is impliedly reserved to the extent necessary to meet the primary purposes for which a
reservation is made); United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (D.
Nev. 2004) (holding that fishing is a purpose to which the tribes may apply reserved water
rights); United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist. 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1454-55 (D. Ariz.
1996) (upholding tribes’ rights to water quality and not just water quantity for reserved water
rights on their reservations). “The Fish and Wildlife Service of the [Department of the
Interior], in particular, is required to consult with tribes prior to designating reservation lands
as critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act.” McCarthy, supra note 213, at 101.
States may impose environmental regulations on tribes if they meet the “conservation
necessity” test, which includes as a necessary element that “(1) the sovereign . . . has
jurisdiction in the area where the activity occurs . . . .” United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d
1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 683 (1942) (“The
state does not claim power to regulate fishing by the Indians in their own reservation.”).
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notable impacts is the role this ruling plays in the trend of increased tribal
sovereignty. The tribes argued that state criminal jurisdiction at Maryhill
would negatively affect their “ownership interests and sovereign powers,”
and State v. Jim protects tribes from that result.398
A. Changing Tides, States and Tribes
The modern-day official Indian policy is one of "fostering tribal selfgovernment,” 399 and “Congress delegates more and more of its exclusive
Indian affairs authority to tribes . . . .” 400 The federal government is slowly
and intentionally getting out of Indian affairs.401 Additionally, tribes today
are much more competent at looking out for their own interests than they
were several decades ago, lessening the need for the “guardian” to look
after its “ward.”
A positive federal relationship may not be anything new; however, what
is noteworthy is the growing cooperation between states and tribes.
“American Indian law is transforming.” 402 “The political relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes remains, but a new and more
dynamic relationship between states and Indian tribes is growing.” 403
Though the State v. Jim ruling may be a big step for Washington, it is not
the first state to move in this direction. The “new approaches [to tribal
sovereignty are] focusing more on tribal participation, partnerships, and
increased control during the modern era of self-determination.” 404
According to one American Indian law scholar,
States and Indian tribes are beginning to smooth over the rough edges of
federal Indian law--jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity between
states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns for tax revenue,
economic development opportunities, and regulatory authority--through
cooperative agreements. In effect, a new political relationship is pringing up

398. Brief for Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 271, at 1.
399. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5 (1982) (citing Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980)).
400. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 82.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 74.
403. Id.
404. Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065,
1067-68 (2008).
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all over the nation between states, local units of government, and Indian
tribes. 405
Violence and racism no longer form the basis of the tribal and state
relationship. 406 In fact, in many areas “states and tribes are moving toward
These
changing
[increased]
intergovernmental
cooperation.” 407
relationships are also reflected in the federal statutes, which require state
and tribal cooperation, 408 and even in Washington State regulations, which
require tribal consultation for certain state projects. 409 Most states,
including Washington, “now recognize Indian tribes as legitimate
governments,” as well as “de facto political sovereigns.” 410 In short, “tribalstate cooperation and agreement is growing.” 411
Intergovernmental agreements have become a great tool for “settling . . .
jurisdictional dispute[s],” such as the one at issue in State v. Jim, because
they can provide certainty in a field of Indian law, which often “offers
nothing more than gray areas.” 412 These tribal-state agreements have in
some cases “extended [tribal] jurisdiction outside of the[ir] reservation[s] . .
. .” 413 Some tribes “continue to be reluctant to engage” states in these
negotiations, 414 but that may change should tribal-state relations continue to
improve. In fact, the increase in negotiated settlements was due in part to
the recognized potential for state courts to be a “hostile forum.” 415
Washington’s highest court has proven to be anything but hostile. The
ruling in State v. Jim may be indicative of a shifting policy and improved
relationship between the state and the tribes.

405. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 74.
406. Id. at 86.
407. Royster, supra note 406, at 1094 n.170.
408. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 82 (stating “the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act[] authorize and even mandate cooperation between Indian tribes and
states.”).
409. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 90.82.080(3) (2013) (requiring "government-togovernment consultation with affected tribes" before setting minimum instream flows).
410. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 79, 83 (emphasis added). “Many states (including
Washington) now require their agencies to deal with Indian tribes on a ‘government to
government’ basis.” Id. at 83.
411. Id. at 74.
412. Id. at 84 (citing Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy,
and the Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2004)).
413. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 84.
414. Id. at 83.
415. Royster, supra note 146, at 100-01.
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B. Criminal Enforcement
Part of the state’s reluctance to concede jurisdiction may be due in part to
legitimate interests in criminal enforcement. Historically the tribal criminal
justice system has been subpar. It tends to suffer from a lack of enthusiasm
by federal prosecutors, insufficient federal resources, and limited tribal
authority. 416 Reports show that while certain aspects of the tribal law
enforcement programs are in good shape, 417 others are far below their state
or federal counterparts. “[F]indings by the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights indicate that[] [a]ll three components of law enforcement--policing,
justice, and corrections--are substandard in Indian Country as compared
with the rest of the nation.” 418 Though in many respects Native American
sovereignty is on the rise, criminal justice in Indian Country has
experienced resistance to the “self-determination” movement. 419 This may
be due in large part to questions of legitimacy and enforcement capacity–the same concerns at issue in State v. Jim. 420
In the State v. Jim litigation, the Columbia River treaty tribes asserted
that they are “stepping up efforts to curb criminal activity” at their fishing
sites. 421 But this claim is unsupported by the record and “the stepped up
tribal enforcement activity” appears to only have begun after Jim was cited
in 2008. 422 Additionally, although the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission (“CRITFC”) has enforcement officers, the “Yakama ha[ve]
not commissioned CRITFC . . . [o]fficers since 2003.” 423 Consequently,
“CRITFC . . . officers cannot cite Yakama [citizen] fishers,” who make up
416. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 46-47. For example, tribal systems have typically
suffered from an insufficient number of federal prosecutors and investigators to perform the
tasks. There are disproportionately few law enforcement officers in Indian Country. In 2000,
the BIA and tribal agencies employed officers composing less than 3% of federal officers
and less than 1% of state officers. Id. at 53. Tribes have some enforcement authority, but
“[o]ften, tribal law enforcement officers are limited to restraining . . . perpetrators until a
county, [s]tate, or [f]ederal officer arrives.” Id.
417. “In 2002, [Department of the Interior’s] Inspector General conducted a departmentwide review of law enforcement programs, and cited the BIA as a model for personnel and
training standards, operations manuals, staffing redeployment, records systems, and incident
reporting.” Id. at 53.
418. Id. at 56.
419. Washburn, supra note 230, at 714.
420. For a more detailed analysis of tribal criminal justice systems, see id. at 713-14.
421. Brief for Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 271, at 19.
422. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at 18-19.
423. Id. at 19 n.12.
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“75% of tribal fishers on the Columbia River . . . .” 424 In fact, Washington
Department of Fish and Game increased patrols precisely to compensate for
the lack of enforcement presence provided by CRITFC. 425 The state pointed
out that with “four Indian tribes [being] equally entitled” to the land, “it is
doubtful that any of the four tribal governments” could enforce against the
other three, because the basis for prosecuting non-member Indians has been
the tribe’s ownership of the land. 426
In addition to lack of enforcement for crimes committed by tribal
members, relevant tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians. 427
“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory . . . .” 428 “[L]and ownership
‘may sometimes be a dispositive factor’ in establishing a tribal court’s
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians” as well. 429 But generally tribes
have limited jurisdiction and authority over non-Indians. 430
Because non-Indians frequent fishing access sites, the criminal
jurisdictional gap is cause for state concern.431 Without the jurisdiction
granted by Public Law 280 and “similar federal statutes, states [(including
Washington)] have no jurisdiction over Indian [C]ountry,” 432 and the
resulting “jurisdictional vacuum” would leave room for more than just
unprosecuted criminal fishing violations.433 The state’s concerns about
crimes such as domestic violence 434 at these sites are not unfounded.
Indians are statistically far more likely to become victims of violent crime,

424. Id.
425. Id.
426. State’s Response Brief, supra note 257, at 27.
427. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that
tribes cannot criminally prosecute non-Indians).
428. United States v. Mauzurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
429. Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 (9th Cir.
2011).
430. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A–1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 549 (1981).
The right to exclude non-Indians from tribal land includes the power to regulate them. See
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (stating “[t]ribal authority over
activities in non-Indian land is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”).
431. State of Washington’s Response Brief to Amici Curiae, supra note 256, at 19.
432. Brief for Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 271, at 18 (citing State v. Cooper, 928 P.2d 406,
407 (Wash. 1996)).
433. State’s Response Brief, supra note 257, at 26.
434. Id.
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including rape/sexual assault, than any other racial class.435 Additionally,
sexual offenses against women and children-–such as those at issue in
Cooper 436–-are very serious problems in Indian Country. 437 Just how the
state and tribes will respond to the “significant vacuum” 438 of criminal
enforcement authority is yet to be determined.
Though the tribal criminal justice system may be in need of
improvement, tribal natural resource management generally appears to be in
far better condition. “Tribes [already] play the leading role in management
of their own fish and wildlife resources[, and] [t]hey have formed a number
of inter-tribal organizations to assist in the administration of fish and
wildlife programs.” 439 “[I]t is widely recognized that tribal governments
and inter-tribal fish and wildlife management organizations have been
amongst the most effective stewards of natural resources, both on tribal
lands and off . . . .” 440 Though the state’s concerns about criminal
enforcement may be legitimate, tribes have proven themselves to be
competent and capable stewards of their natural resources, including
salmon, for thousands of years.
VI. Conclusion
The vindication, and expansion, of reserved treaty fishing rights has been
a long, slow, painful, and often passionate ordeal. Washington State has
historically operated in line with the “deadliest enemies” model that has
characterized many tribal and state relationships. Tribal fishing rights were
often ignored by the state, as Indian populations declined along with tribal
self-governance rights. To this day, “fishing remains an important aspect of
tribal life, providing food, employment, and . . . cultural identity.”441 Also,
with tribal populations on the rise and many anadromous fish species in a

435. Steven W. Perry, American Indians and Crime: A BJS Statistical Profile, 19922002, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 5 (Dec. 2004), http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/american_
indians_and_crime.pdf.
436. See generally Cooper, 928 P.2d 406.
437. Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Full Report of the Prevalence, Incidence, and
Consequences of Violence Against Women, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 21-23 (Nov. 2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
438. State’s Response Brief, supra note 257, at 26.
439. McCarthy, supra note 213, at 100.
440. Id. (quoting Status of Tribal Fish and Wildlife Management Programs: Oversight
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (opening statement of
Vice Chairman Inouye)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
441. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1975)
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vulnerable state, the right to fish is one of increasing importance for the
Northwest treaty tribes.
State courts were historically very severe toward Native Americans.
Even though the canons of construction demand that ambiguity be resolved
in favor of the tribes, state courts generally preferred to find no ambiguity at
all, ruling in favor of state interests. Washington’s Supreme Court would
have been justified in doing the same in State v. Jim. Though states and
their courts have historically created a hostile environment for Native
American treaty fisherman, there may now be momentum for a new tribalstate relationship.
In State v. Jim, the Washington Supreme Court broke from the historical
“deadliest enemies” model and ruled strongly in the tribe’s favor. The
Maryhill TFAS, the “in-lieu” sites, and all other “usual and accustomed”
fishing sites were generally thought to be within the state’s criminal
jurisdiction. By ruling that Maryhill is tribal land held in trust with a
restraint against alienation, and even more surprisingly, that while it is “not
the Yakama Indian Reservation, it is nonetheless . . . an Indian
reservation,” 442 the court approved a major limitation on the criminal
jurisdictional power of its state. This ruling goes beyond simply protecting
treaty fishing rights, instead expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction in all
areas and leaving the tribe’s with increased sovereignty and ability to selfgovern.
This trend is not uncommon in the unique distribution of power between
the federal government and the tribes, but it is new for states. How this
ruling will play out has yet to be determined. The TFAS “reservations” are
held in common for four different tribes, each of which has limited ability
to regulate the others. Additionally, although tribal management of natural
resources, including anadromous fish, may be exemplary, tribal criminal
justice and enforcement has typically lagged behind its state and federal
counterparts. To make matters worse, Native Americans are far more likely
than other racial groups to be victims of violent crime, and the remote
locations of the various fishing sites will not make supervision and
enforcement any easier.
Though some are still skeptical of tribes’ ability to self-govern,
“[r]etiring the ‘deadliest enemies’ model of tribal-state relations would be a
powerful step in the right direction.” 443 State v. Jim may be an important
part of this movement toward improved tribal-state relations. The State v.
442. State v. Jim, 273 P.3d 434, 438 (Wash. 2012).
443. See Fletcher, supra note 50, at 87.
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Jim decision is not just a victory for tribal fishing rights, which have long
suffered attack in Washington State, but it also notes a shift in the
Washington Supreme Court’s tone toward sovereignty in general. Perhaps
this opinion can be seen as part of greater change that is occurring in the
Northwest. With increasing strength in treaty fishing rights, increased
jurisdictional power, and increasing cooperation between states and tribes,
perhaps the treaty tribes of the Northwest will have a brighter future ahead
of them.
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